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ARTICLES
THE TROUBLE WITH ROBERTSON: EQUAL
PROTECTION, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS,
AND THE LINE BETWEEN STATUTORY
AMENDMENT AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
William D. Araiza

The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows ....

If the

inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding.'
A fundamental precept of the federal constitutional structure, and of
most state constitutional structures as well, is the distinction between a
legislature's power to enact laws and a court's authority to interpret them
in the course of adjudicating a case.' But despite, or perhaps because of,
its fundamental nature, this distinction confounds attempts to delineate it
with any precision. At base, the problem is that statutory language reflects many choices that could also be made by courts. For example, legislation can define terms or even deem that certain conduct satisfies elements or provisions elsewhere in the statute. In the absence of such
definitions or "deeming" clauses, such decisions are made by the courts.
Since legislatures and courts share this power, questions will inevitably
arise about when one branch-usually the legislature-has unconstitu-

Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. Thanks are due to Ellen Aprill,
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Catherine Fisk, David Leonard, Calvin Massey, Christopher May,
Rory Little, and Georgene Vairo for their review of and helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article. Thanks also to Bill Hunter, Lorena Montenegro Madrigal, Nieves
Rubio, and Rusty Thomas for fine research assistance.
1. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325 (1866).
2. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives."), with id. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish."). See generally, e.g., AL. CONST. art. III, § 42 (establishing
legislative, executive and judicial branches, and prohibiting each branch from exercising
the powers of either of the others); AZ. CONST. art. 3 (same); Tx. CONST. art. 2, § 1
(same); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 5 (same).
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tionally encroached on the functions of the other.
Modem jurisprudence on this issue has been bedeviled by the troublesome case of United States v. Klein,3 a Reconstruction-era case where, according to the Court, Congress did in fact "pass[] the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power.",4 The facts of Klein are set
forth in greater detail later in this Article;5 very briefly, the statute struck
down in Klein purported to instruct courts on how to determine whether
a particular element in a statutory claim procedure had been satisfied.
The Klein Court held that such instruction purported to dictate to the
courts a "rule of decision," and thus intruded into the judicial realm.6
The problem with this broad reading of Klein' is that Congress had established the right to recovery in the first place. Given that fact, why
could Congress not subsequently explain or make more precise the
meaning of a particular element required for recovery? Of course, some
congressional "explanations" are clearly inappropriate. For example,
Congress may not "explain" the meaning of a constitutional provision; at
most, it has the power to "enforce" the provisions of a number of
amendments.8 But that proposition is uncontroversial, because Congress
obviously does not have the power unilaterally to amend the Constitution. In addition, Congress may not identify an individual by name and
deem her guilty of a particular crime. But that, too, is an easy call, given
the explicit prohibition of the Bill of Attainder Clause.9 Harder questions arise when Congress attempts to explain or make more precise a
statutory rule. These are the harder questions because Congress created
the rule to begin with, and should be allowed broad leeway to manipulate the rule as it sees fit. At some point, though, such manipulation presumably intrudes on the province of the courts. Where is the line?
In order to examine this question, it may help to consider a situation
3. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
4. Id. at 147.
5. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
6. See 80 U.S. at 146.
7. There are other ways to read Klein, as noted below. See infra notes 90-96 and
accompanying text (discussing other commentators' interpretations of Klein).
8. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (authorizing Congress to "enforce" the
provisions of the amendment). This prohibition reflects one of the alternate readings of
Klein. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. On the other hand, there may be situations where Congress has substantial latitude to determine the scope of its own constitutional authority. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) (explaining that
the proper test for determining whether a statute is a permissible regulation of interstate
commerce asks whether Congress had a reasonable basis for believing that the regulated
activity had a substantial effect on interstate commerce).
3.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.

1999] The Line Between Statutory Amendment & Statutory Interpretation 1057

where Congress enacted, and the courts reviewed, an actual statute that
seems intuitively close to whatever line may exist. Such a case study
arose out of the controversy over logging in the Pacific Northwest in the
late 1980's. In 1989, as part of the annual appropriations bill for the Interior Department, Congress imposed new requirements on the U.S. Forest Service's management of certain old-growth National forests in the
Pacific Northwest. That provision, section 318 of the appropriations bill,
was intended as a temporary political settlement to the battle that had
raged during the previous few years over logging in those forests. Ultimately, that controversy focused on the future of the Northern Spotted
Owl, an endangered species native to the area and threatened by the
prospect of intensified logging in those forests." The compromise embodied in section 318 essentially was to create new protections for the
benefit of the Spotted Owl (namely, the consolidation of protected areas
to maximize contiguous owl habitat), while opening up other lands for
logging and withdrawing those latter areas from the protection of various
environmental statutes.
The substance of this compromise -something for the loggers, and
something for the owls-was classic politics, and its enshrining in a statute is usually an accepted result of the political process. What makes this
statute unusual is the means Congress used to express this compromise.
By the time section 318 was enacted, the battle over logging had reached
the federal courts, in the form of two separate lawsuits in which the
plaintiffs, the Portland and Seattle Audubon societies, alleged that the
Forest Service's management of those forests had violated a variety of
federal statutes." Section 318 aimed squarely at those pending suits. After subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) imposed new protections for the benefit
of the owl, subsection (b)(6)(A) "determine[d] and direct[ed]" that implementation of these new protective measures
is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases
captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson,
Civil No. 89-160 and Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et

10. During 1989 and 1990 the dispute about the Spotted Owl was the subject of a
great deal of controversy. For background information on the political aspects of the controversy, see sources listed infra at note 36.
11. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violation of five federal statutes: the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994); the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1994); the National Forest Management
Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600 & 1611-1614 (1994); the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994); and the Oregon and California
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1181 (1994).
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al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case Portland Audubon Society et
al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-FR.Y
This statute raises immediately significant separation of powers issues.
First, it enacts into law a rule that certain conduct satisfies pre-existing
law, without explicitly changing that law. Congress has often enacted
laws overturning judicial interpretations of previously-enacted statutes
that it believes the courts have misinterpreted." But section 318 seems
different; rather than enacting a new rule that Congress may have
thought was already implicit in the previously-enacted but misinterpreted
statute, section 318 explicitly purports to apply law to a hypothetical fact
situation. Section 318 imposes the following rule: if the government satisfies the substantive forest management requirements imposed by section 318's other provisions, then subsection (b)(6)(A) deems previouslyenacted law to have been satisfied. This format deviates from the classic
form of legislation, in which the legislature does not purport to decide
whether particular conduct satisfies an existing statutory standard, but
uses instead a format that suggests imposition of a new standard. In departing from that classic format, section 318 arguably intrudes on the judiciary's law-interpreting function.
Second, in an even more direct challenge to judicial authority, section
318 explicitly mentions case names-indeed, it even mentions a particular order granting a preliminary injunction. Of course, it does so not as
part of a direct command that courts hearing those cases should act in a
certain way; rather, it simply uses those cases as a shorthand reference
for the statutes section 318 was designed to affect, i.e., all the statutes alleged to have been violated in the Seattle Audubon and PortlandAudubon complaints. Nevertheless, section 318 effectively orders the courts
hearing the named cases still pending when section 318 was enacted to
conclude that certain conduct must be found to satisfy the pre-existing
legal requirements. Thus, in practical effect, subsection (b)(6)(A) does
not just use the case names as shorthand references, but decides those
cases. It is also worth noting that, because section 318's new substantive
requirements deal only with the Northwest forests, few other lawsuits
12. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318 (b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989).
13. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071
(1991) (providing additional employment discrimination remedies by modifying Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) and overruling EEOC v. Arabian Am.
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205,
96 Stat. 131 (1982) (clarifying dates and definitions concerning voting rights by modifying
Supreme Court precedent construing the original version of the statute).
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would be affected by section 318 (b)(6)(A)'s potentially result-directing
mandate. The possibility that subsection (b)(6)(A) might have little effect beyond the two cases it decides heightens the suspicion that it
crosses the line from legislation to adjudication.
Thus understood, section 318's significance extends beyond environmental law to implicate the fundamental issue of legislative interference
with the judicial function. Courts hearing particular named cases are put
on notice that Congress has decided what conduct satisfies the laws alleged to have been violated. Aside from a direct command to enter
judgment for a particular party, it is hard to envision a clearer example of
legislative interference with the affairs of the courts. More generally, this
appears to be, at least at first glance, a case of Congress overstepping its
power by attempting to act as something other than a legislature. But
even if one is not willing to endorse either of those serious charges, it is
hard to avoid the feeling that there is something inappropriately nonlegislative about this statute.
A different approach to section 318, however, yields the diametrically
opposite conclusion-that it represents a completely unexceptional use
of the legislative power. First, it should be fairly clear that Congress
could achieve the substance of what it sought to legislate in section 318.
Most obviously, it could have amended the pre-existing environmental
statutes so as to exempt from their coverage those particular forests, and
in their place impose new requirements. Such special treatment for these
particular forests might be subject to challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, but the deferential review applied to such legislation
strongly suggests that the classification embodied in such exemptions
would pass constitutional muster. 14 Second, and more germane to the
question of whether section 318 is a legitimately legislative act, it is clear
that, in some sense, all legislation amounts to the imposition of legal liability on individuals involved in certain fact patterns. Thus, when a legislature enacts a statute stating that a person shall be guilty of armed
robbery if he uses or threatens to use a gun to obtain property not rightfully his, it is essentially saying that certain facts (use or threatened use of
a weapon with a particular intention) satisfy the legal standard for armed
robbery. Section 318 easily fits into that uncontroversial format; under
one very plausible reading, the statute merely amends previouslyenacted environmental laws by adding an alternative method of compliance. Such an amendment would be well within the legislative power.

14. See infra Part IV.C (discussing viability of an equal protection challenge to section 318).
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Each of these conceptions of section 318-as an act beyond the legislative power, and as a completely unexceptional piece of legislation-has
been embraced by a unanimous federal court. In Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson,5 a Ninth Circuit panel unanimously struck down section
318 as an unconstitutional congressional infringement on the judicial
power. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected that analysis, concluding that section 318 simply amended pre-existing law." Thus, section
318 and these two Robertson opinions" provide an ideal vehicle for examining the difficult, but fundamental, issue of the relationship between
legislative and judicial power.
This Article examines this relationship, through the prism of Robertson. Part I sets forth the background to the Robertson litigation, and describes the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court opinions. It leaves us with
a tentative conclusion that, while Congress almost certainly should have
been able to reach the result it desired, the format of section 318 gives
rise to suspicion about Congress' motives and the appropriateness of the
format it chose. This discussion sets the stage for the rest of the Article,
which focuses on a search for a workable doctrinal response to such actions. In this context, the workability of a doctrine rests on two factors:
first, the extent to which it responds to the real concerns triggering our
suspicion, as opposed to focusing merely on formalistic concerns about
the particular format a statute takes; and second, the extent to which it
can be competently applied by courts.
Part II begins this search by considering the position taken by the
Ninth Circuit, namely, that section 318 did not change the underlying law
but instead sought to dictate results under existing law, and thus is invalid under United States v. Klein." This section of the Article considers
courts' attempts to apply Klein's possible rule' 9 against legislature result
directing. Most of the recent attempts have arisen in the course of challenges to two federal statutes: a 1991 amendment to the federal securities

15. 914 F.2d 1311,1315-16 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503 U.S. 429,441 (1992).
16. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
17. The Ninth Circuit consolidated the Seattle Audubon and PortlandAudubon lawsuits for purposes of answering this constitutional issue. See Seattle Audubon, 914 F.2d at
1312-14. This Article will refer to this litigation as the Robertson case. Unless otherwise
stated, references in this Article to the Robertson opinion are to the Supreme Court's
opinion. References to the Ninth Circuit's opinion will be identified as such.

18. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128,148 (1871).
19. As scholars have pointed out, it is open to question whether this "rule" was, in
fact, a holding in Klein, given the factual circumstances surrounding that case. See infra
note 69. For convenience, this Article will nevertheless refer to Klein's analysis of Con-

gress' power to direct results in federal court as the Klein "rule."
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laws" and a 1996 law restricting the federal courts' injunctive power over
state prison operations.2 ' The Supreme Court has not considered Kleinbased arguments against these statutes;22 these lower court opinions,
however, are useful for the insight they give into the difficulty of applying the Klein rule. Given the internal tension in the Klein rule, none of
the applications is completely satisfactory. Ironically, the most satisfactory attempt to apply Klein appears to come in the Ninth Circuit's own
opinion in Robertson, an opinion which, as noted in Part I, is subject to
the very plausible criticisms put forth by the Supreme Court's decision
reversing the Ninth Circuit. Part II's brief review of recent attempts to
apply Klein suggests that the search for constitutional problems with section 318 should focus elsewhere.
Part III begins that search by referring to one of section 318's most
striking features-its extreme specificity. Section 318 is clearly aimed at
two pending cases (not just because it named them, but more importantly
because it limited its effect to only, but all, of the statutory claims made
in those cases, and because it purported to affect only certain National
forests). This specificity raises concerns associated not only with equal
protection,23 but also with the concept of separation of powers. Part III
takes up this idea of "singling out" as a separation of powers issue. Two
recent concurring opinions -Justice Breyer's opinion in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,24 and Justice Powell's opinion in Immigration and Naturali2
zation Service v. Chadha,E
-base their separation of powers analyses on
this singling out concern. The concern is one based on a fundamental
political science insight, namely, that a majoritarian legislature cannot be
trusted to impose burdens on particularly identified individuals; instead,
such particularized application of government power must be entrusted
to politically-neutral courts. Of course, sometimes government should

20. See Special Provision Relating to Statute of Limitations on Private Causes of Action, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2387 (1991) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1

(1994)). This Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
21. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66
(1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994)).
22. The Court struck down the securities statute on narrower grounds. See Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995). The Court has not yet granted certitorari

in a case challenging the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (containing the Equal Protection Clause applicable to the states); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (holding that

the Fifth Amendment's due process clause, a limitation on federal government power,
contains an equal protection element analogous to the Fourteenth Amendment's restriction on state power).
24.
25.

514 U.S. 211,242 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
462 U:S. 919, 960-62 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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be able to single out. For example, a legislature might reasonably conclude that it is dealing with a legitimate class consisting of one person.
Justice Breyer's analysis, however, does not provide a complete explanation of when the legislature can appropriately single out." In part because he is dealing with a different fact situation, Justice Powell's analysis
does address this issue 7 Justice Powell suggests that singling out may be
a special concern when the action at issue is one sufficiently burdensome
on. the individual that due process would require procedural protections
unavailable in a legislative context.
Justice Powell's analysis leads to a discussion of the relevance of due
process analysis to section 318.28 While due process per se does not apply
to section 318, the more general foundations of due process jurisprudence do provide some useful insights. Foundational cases from the early
part of this century suggest that individuals who do not have a due process right to a hearing must instead protect their interests in the political
process. That conclusion suggests that a fair political process, if not an
officially recognized constitutional requirement, 21 is at least a goal that
should inform other legal doctrines. This idea has come to be known as
"due process of lawmaking", to which this Article turns next.
After introducing the concept of due process of lawmaking,0 Part IV
applies it to section 318. Commentators have criticized the appropriations rider process, the process by which section 318 was enacted, as reducing the quality of the resulting legislation and impairing public access
to the legislative process. One major concern is that the rider process
impairs legislative deliberation. Part IV considers the legislative deliberation argument as applied to section 318, and finds it wanting." It is, at
best, unproven that the appropriations rider process caused the legislature to misunderstand or give inadequate thought to what it was doing,
especially given the high profile nature of the issue. It is similarly questionable whether the process led to the public being shut out of the legislative process any more so than normal. At best, then, this analysis
does not show conclusively that legislative deliberation was impaired by
26. See infra Part III.B.1-2 (discussing issues of separation of powers presented by
singling out).
27. See infra Part III.B.3 (examining Justice Powell's concurrence in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
28. See infra Part III.C (exploring due process implications of section 318).
29. See infra note 250 (discussing the federal constitutionality of a state constitutional
provision passed through the political process).
30. See infra Part IV.A (exploring due process concerns implicated in the political
process).
31. See infra Part IV.B (discussing due process in the context of section 318).
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the section 318 process. Even assuming that the rider process entails
these process flaws, it remains unclear how a court would go about determining whether the legislature had given the "proper" amount of deliberation to a given rider.
However, section 318 does give rise to a concern on another front.
Section 318's format, a declaration that certain conduct satisfies preexisting law, is arguably inconsistent with the discovery or imputation of
a legislative purpose underlying the statute. The purpose requirement is
fundamental to equal protection law; without a legislative purpose, it becomes impossible to determine the reasonableness of a statute's classification, the ultimate issue addressed by equal protection analysis. Under
the most deferential version of equal protection review, courts often do
no more than hypothesize the existence of such a purpose. But even
such imputed, or constructive, purposes seem logically beyond the reach
of statutes that are phrased, like section 318, as interpretations of preexisting laws. Part IV (C) therefore suggests that section 318 may, after
all, violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Since this objection speaks merely to section 318's format, as opposed
to the substantive result it attempts to achieve, it is worth asking whether
format should matter in this case. This Article suggests that it might.32 In
other doctrinal areas, the Supreme Court has imposed restrictions on the
format by which Congress could legislate, even when the substance of the
challenged legislative action was also constitutionally questionable. Thus,
format seems to have some independent significance for the Court.
Moreover, a requirement that statutes be framed as directly regulating
conduct, as opposed to providing that certain conduct satisfies preexisting regulation, may prompt legislative debate on the value of the
conduct to be regulated, or the efficacy of such regulation in promoting
the public good. Thus, both formalistic and pragmatic concerns may be
vindicated by a "statutory purpose" rule of the sort suggested by this Article.
Applying this rule requires overcoming two major hurdles.33 First,
Congress often enacts precisely-tailored bills that explicitly command
that certain action occur "notwithstanding" the requirements of any
other law. Moreover, sometimes, as in a case distinguished by the Ninth
Circuit in Robertson, the legislative history of such a statute indicates an
interpretive intent behind the rule; that is, Congress believed the action it
32. See infra Part IV.C.1 (examining the importance of format in the analysis of the
statutory purpose of section 318).
33. See infra Part IV.C.2 (outlining the legislature's approach to legislating under the
statutory purpose rule).
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was commanding was legal under pre-existing law, but apparently
wanted to ensure that its interpretation ultimately prevailed.34 Such statutes satisfy the "statutory purpose" rule, but seem virtually indistinguishable from legislation, such as section 318, that this Article suggests fails
the rule. Second, sometimes Congress acts by explicitly enacting or
amending statutory definitions. Legislative definitions or redefinitions of
statutory terms are commonplace and generally quite desirable, as they
render the legislature's intent more precise and easily discoverable.
Nevertheless, such definitions have an interpretive quality. That quality
is especially pronounced in the case of redefinitions, which have the effect of altering the reach of the statute without purporting to change its
substance.
But "notwithstanding" clauses and redefinitions can be understood as
consistent with the "statutory purpose" rule. In both cases, the key
seems to be the plausibility of the statute's interpretation or redefinition.
If such interpretive acts reflect plausible readings of the original statute,
then the legislature's interpretation or redefinition can be viewed as part
of the ongoing dialogue between legislature and court over the original
legislation's meaning. To the extent they can be so described, these statutes should be considered part of the string of legislative enactment, judicial interpretation, and legislative correction. As such, they satisfy the
"statutory purpose" rule by relating back to the purpose underlying the
original statute. Even a statutory redefinition can satisfy the rule, if the
redefinition makes the statutory term more precise, or updates it to take
account of empirical changes that require a redefinition in order to vindicate the statute's underlying purpose.
However, these explanations come at a price. Part IV of this Article
concludes by suggesting that the very success of these attempts to distinguish certain statutory styles effectively limits the scope of the "statutory
purpose" rule. In turn, the limitation of the rule's scope, and the ease
with which Congress can evade even that limited scope, suggests that the
purpose requirement in equal protection law is fundamentally problematic. This conclusion creates a dilemma, as the purpose requirement is a
fundamental component of the boundary between legislative and judicial
power.
There seems, then, to be no easy way to delineate the legislative/judicial
boundary line. Concluding, Part V raises the possibility that, as a practical matter, this part of the border must be left to the legislature's self-

34. See Stop H-3 Assoc. v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989); see also infra notes
332-38 and accompanying text (discussing Stop H-3).
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policing. However, the doubtful efficacy of such self-policing, and the
importance of the values at stake, suggest that courts should scrutinize
suspect legislative action with some care, even if that scrutiny is not perfect. The Court's opinion in Robertson shrinks from the task, denying
that section 318 even implicates any broad separation of powers issue. In
the end, this abdication constitutes Robertson's most troubling failure.
I. THE ROBERTSON LITIGATION

A. Introduction
Robertson grew out of litigation in which environmental groups objected to the federal government's logging policies in the National forests
of the Pacific Northwest. 35 By 1989, those policies had become quite controversial, and the controversy had focused on the Northern Spotted
Owl, an endangered species native to the Northwest•36forests. The dispute
took on the classic form of jobs versus the environment. The particular
dispute that led to the Robertson decision involved the environmental
groups' challenge to the United States Forest Service's adoption of a Record of Decision and Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS),37 which had the effect of allowing logging activities to continue in these National forests. The environmental groups filed suit,
alleging that the logging would violate a variety of environmental statutes, including National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA).38 The district court granted a preliminary injunction forbidding 140 imminent timber sales.39
It was at this point that Congress stepped in, enacting section 318.
Much of section 318 imposed new requirements on the Forest Service's
management of the old-growth Northwest forests, pursuant to the compromise described earlier.40 For example, subsection (b)(1) required the

35. A fuller discussion of the history of this litigation, told from the perspective of
one of the environmental groups' attorneys, can be found in Victor M. Sher, Travels With
Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey Through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 41
(1993).
36. See, e.g., Michael D. Lemonick, Showdown in the Treetops, TIME, Aug. 28, 1989,
at 58-59; Owls v. Trees Compromise Grounded, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 29,1989,
at A9; For the Birds, THE ECONOMIST, March 4,1989, at 26-28.
37. Generation of these documents was required by the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1994).
38. See supra note 11 (listing the statutes alleged to have been violated).
39. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, No. C89-160, 1990 WL 152627 (W.D.
Wash. May 11, 1990).
40. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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Service to "minimize fragmentation of the most ecologically significant
old growth forest stands.",41 More relevant to the Robertson case, subsection (b)(3) prohibited sales of timber from "Spotted Owl Habitat Areas"
(SOHAs) identified in the FSEIS, 2 while subsection (b)(5) required the
Federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to identify additional SOHAs, which would also be off-limits for logging during the next fiscal
year. 43
For our purposes, section 318's key provision is subsection (b)(6)(A),
which provided that compliance with the spotted-owl protective provisions of subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) was to be considered "adequate
consideration for the purpose of meeting" the statutory requirements
alleged to have been violated in the pending Seattle Audubon and Portland Audubon litigation." Based on subsection (b)(6)(A), the district
court in the Seattle Audubon case vacated its preliminary injunction
against the planned timber sales,45 while the court in the PortlandAudubon suit dismissed the complaint on the same basis.4'6 Both of these
courts rejected constitutional challenges to section 318, setting the stage
for the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court opinions on the statute's constitutionality.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion
The Ninth Circuit's discussion of the constitutional issue focused almost immediately on the format of the statute, namely, its specification
of a particular result in cases identified by name. The first paragraph of
the court's analysis makes this clear:
By section 318, Congress for the first time endeavors to instruct
federal courts to reach a particular result in pending cases identified by caption and file number. Subsection (b)(6)(A) raises
serious constitutional concerns in light of Article III's stated
premise that the judicial power of the United States, encompassing cases and controversies, lies in the federal courts and

41. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal
Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(b)(1), 103 Stat. 701, 745-46 (1989).
42. See id. § 318(b)(3), 103 Stat. at 746.
43. See id. § 318(b)(5), 103 Stat. at 746-47
44. See id. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747.
45. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y, No. C89-160, 1990 WL 152627, (W.D. Wash. May 11,
1990), rev'd, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
46. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, No. 87-1160, 1989 WL 155694 (D. Or. Dec.
21, 1989), rev'd sub nom. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir.
1990), rev'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
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not in Congress.47
The court then identified the controlling law as the Supreme Court's
1871 opinion in United States v. Klein." In Klein, the Court struck down
a statute prescribing the effect presidential pardons would have in lawsuits brought by pardoned Confederates to recover property seized by
federal agents during the Civil War. In addition to simply prescribing
that a pardon should not be allowed as evidence of loyalty (a prerequisite
to property recovery), the statute directed the Supreme Court to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction any case in which the claimant had prevailed in
the lower courts based on the claimant's receipt of a pardon. Despite the
statute's phrasing of the prohibition as a limitation on jurisdiction, a
subject over which the Court had just recently acknowledged Congress'
broad power,49 the Klein court concluded that the statute went beyond
Congress' jurisdiction-stripping authority to prescribe a rule of decision
for the courts. The analogy between the Klein statute and section 318 is
clear: just as the Klein statute purported to require the courts to reach a
particular decision on claims founded on a presidential pardon, so section 318 could be viewed as attempting to require the courts to interpret
the pre-existing statutes in a particular way, i.e., as being satisfied by
compliance with subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5).
In deriving the rule governing the case before it, the Ninth Circuit then
noted that Klein had distinguished an earlier case, Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co.,'0 where a previous judicial order declaring a bridge to be a nuisance was overturned by a congressional decision to make the bridge a post-road for the United States mail. From
these two cases, the Ninth Circuit synthesized the principle that a change
in underlying law would have to be given effect by the courts, but that a
mere prescription of a rule of decision, without a change in law, violated
the separation of powers." The court then distilled this rather abstract
concept into an operational rule. According to the court, the "critical
distinction"
is between the actual repeal or amendment of the law underlying the litigation, which is permissible, and the actual direction
of a particular decision in a case, without repealing or amending
the law underlying the litigation, which is not permissible."

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1314.
See id. (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871)).
See Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-13 (1868).
59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
See Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1315.
Id.
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The court held that subsection (b)(6)(A) "does not . . . repeal or
amend the environmental laws underlying [the] litigation."53 The court
noted specific requirements that the underlying statutes imposed, and
then suggested (but did not say explicitly) that these requirements could
not be viewed reasonably as having been complied with by virtue of
compliance with subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5).54 As a contrast, the court
pointed to another Ninth Circuit decision, Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole,5 in
which an appropriations bill directed the construction of a particular
highway, "notwithstanding" potential violations of environmental statutes.56
The Ninth Circuit concluded its analysis by making explicit what its
preceding discussion had strongly implied: the fault with subsection
(b)(6)(A) lay not in the result Congress was attempting to attain, but in
the means Congress employed to attain it. It noted the obvious, that
Congress could amend or repeal laws, and suggested that Congress could
possibly have written a valid statute, but concluded that it could not
fairly interpret subsection (b)(6)(A) as such a valid amendment or re-

53. Id. at 1316.
54. See id. The court opined further that:
Congress, through section 318, seeks to perform functions reserved to the courts
by Article III of the Constitution. For example, if the Secretary follows subsection (b)(3) and (b)(5), then the Secretary will be found to have used the "principles of multiple use and sustained yield" and the "systematic interdisciplinary
approach" mandated by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) and (2). In addition, the agency will be deemed to have included detailed statements of adverse environmental effects and alternatives required under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332. Also, there will have been no taking of
habitat as proscribed under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703.
Subsection (b)(6)(A) here at issue does not establish new law, but directs the
court to reach a specific result and make certain factual findings under existing
law in connection with two cases pending in federal court. This is what Klein and
subsequent cases agree is constitutionally proscribed.
Id.
55. 870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
56. Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1316-17. The court further distinguished the statute litigated in Stop H-3 from section 318:
The statute challenged in Stop H-3 simply ordered construction of the highway
and specifically, as a matter of permanent law, withdrew the statutory environmental protection provisions underlying the ongoing litigation as to the challenged project by exempting the project from the provisions' requirements. The
provision at issue in Stop H-3 did not leave the underlying statute intact (as to the
H-3 project), order a course of government action, and then direct a court finding
that the environmental statutes' requirements were satisfied by the government
action ordered. That is what Congress did when it enacted section 318, at issue in
the present case.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
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peal. 7 Finally, it concluded, almost as an afterthought, that even if such a
reading were possible, it would be foreclosed by the fact that it took the
form of an appropriations measure, given the court's understanding that
implied repeals could not be found in appropriations measures."'
C. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld section
318."9 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas adopted an analysis of subsection (b)(6)(A) that, while superficially disagreeing with the
appellate court only on the application of the agreed-upon test, in fact
adopted a diametrically opposite analytical method.
Most importantly, the Court concluded that subsection (b)(6)(A)
"compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law." 60 To
illustrate this point, the Court used the example of the application of the
statute to a situation in which the defendant violated the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (MBTA). The Court observed that courts applying subsection (b)(6)(A) in such a case would have to test the defendant's conduct
against both the pre-existing MBTA requirements and the new requirements in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5), and uphold the conduct if it satisfied either. This, of course, describes accurately the effect of subsection
(b)(6)(A), but does nothing to support the Court's characterization of
the statute. Essentially, the Court viewed subsection (b)(6)(A) as effectuating a change in law because it changed the analysis courts employ
when confronted with allegations of violations of laws such as the
MBTA.61
The Court, turning to the respondents' arguments, then found no significance in section 318's format. First, it dismissed the statute's "deter-62
mine[s] and direct[s]" language, characterizing it as "an empty phrase.,
Perhaps more significantly, it attached no importance to the statute's use
of language that compliance with the new requirements is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the pre57. See Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1317; see also Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting,
Eroding the Landscape, Eroding the Laws: Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 435, 475 (1991) (concluding that
the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Robertson turned on section 318's format).
58. See Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1317 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153 (1978)).
59. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
60. Id. at 438.
61. See id. at 438-39 (noting that section 318 left for the courts the determination of
whether subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) were, in fact, satisfied in particular cases).
62. Id. at 439.
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existing statutes. Here the Court's approach diverged significantly from
the Ninth Circuit's:
Congress might have modified MBTA directly, for example, in
order to impose a new obligation of complying either with the
current § 2 [of the MBTA63 ] or with subsections (b)(3) and
(b)(5) [of section 318]. Instead, Congress enacted an entirely
separate statute deeming compliance with subsections (b)(3)
and (b)(5) to constitute compliance with § 2 - a "modification"
of the MBTA, we conclude, through operation of the canon
that specific provisions qualify general ones. As explained
above, each formulation would have produced an identical task
for a court adjudicating the MBTA claims - determining either
that the challenged harvesting did not violate § 2 as currently
64
written or that it did not violate subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5).
Thus, while the Ninth Circuit focused on the law Congress did in fact
write, the Supreme Court focused on the law Congress could have written. Since Congress could have achieved the same result through unquestionably constitutional means, Justice Thomas seems to conclude,
the Court will not impose a constitutional requirement that particular
language be used, but instead will be willing to view a provision such as
subsection (b)(6)(A) as an ordinary amendment to the pre-existing law.65
The Court's focus on the statute Congress could have written was reinforced by its refusal to find significance in subsection (b)(6)(A)'s explicit
reference to the Seattle Audubon and Portland Audubon cases, and its
characterization of that reference as merely a shorthand for the provision's identification of the statutes to be amended. Given this characterization of subsection (b)(6)(A), the Court concluded - unsurprisingly that it did not have to reach the Klein issue identified by the Ninth Circuit.
One last matter required the Court's attention. The Court noted an
amicus' argument that even a prospectively-applied law should be struck
down "if the change [in law] swept no more broadly, or little more66
broadly, than the range of applications at issue in the pending cases."
This theory might justify striking down even a law that, like subsection
63. The Court used section 2 of the MBTA, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994), as an example of
the pre-existing statutory requirements it found to have been amended by section 318.
Section 2 prohibits, among other things, the "taking" or "killing" of any migratory bird.
See 16 U.S.C. § 703.
64. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 439-40 (citations omitted).
65. See id. at 438-41; cf Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89
(1977) (overruling previous precedent that limited state power to tax interstate commerce
based on the wording of the particular tax statute, noting the artificiality of distinctions
that had no practical significance).
66. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441 (citing brief of amicus Public Citizen).
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(b)(6)(A), had been interpreted as a substantive change in law and not a
Klein-condemned attempt to prescribe a rule of decision in a particular
case. The Court refused to consider this theory, however, noting that it
had been neither raised nor decided at the appellate level, nor advanced
by the respondents before the Supreme Court.67
D. The LandscapeAfter the Supreme Court's Opinion
The two Robertson opinions reflect starkly different approaches to the
problem created by legislation that at least suggests improper legislative
direction of judicial results. The Ninth Circuit opinion focused immediately on the statute Congress actually wrote, stressing in its initial characterization of subsection (b)(6)(A), the statute's use of particular case
names and file numbers. 68 This focus naturally led that court to focus on
Klein's possible holding69 regarding the constitutionality of congressional
attempts to intrude into the judicial function. Further, in applying what
it understood to be the Klein rule, the Ninth Circuit again focused on
subsection (b)(6)(A)'s suspiciously non-legislative format. The first sentence of the opinion after the statement of its conclusion makes this
clear: "Section 318 does not, by its plain language, repeal or amend the
environmental laws underlying this litigation, even though some subsections add additional requirements."' 7'
By contrast, the Supreme Court "conclude[d] that subsection
(b)(6)(A) compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old
law."71 The key to the Court's conclusion, the complete opposite of the
Ninth Circuit's, seems to have been its observation that, if allowed to
stand, subsection (b)(6)(A) would operate to change defendants' duties
under statutes such as the MBTA. This observation is certainly correct,
as far as it goes, but cannot be seen as a satisfactory answer to the change
in the law/outcome prescription issue.
The Supreme Court was perhaps on firmer ground when it considered,
and rejected, the arguments offered by the environmental groups in support of the Ninth Circuit's conclusions. Those arguments focused on
67. See id.
68. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1990).
69. At least one commentator has suggested that Klein does not in fact include a
holding on the constitutionality of legislative prescriptions of facts. See Gordon G. Young,
CongressionalRegulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdictionand Processes: United States v.
Klein Revisited, 1981 WIs. L. REV. 1189, 1233-38 (noting that the facts in Klein were
stipulated by both sides, and thus concluding that Klein should be read as offering, at
most, useful dicta on this question).
70. Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1316 (footnote omitted).
71. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438.
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three features of the statute's wording or format: (1) its "determines and
directs" language; (2) its command that compliance with subsection
(b)(6)(A) "meets" the pre-existing requirements; and (3) its use of the
particular names and docket numbers of pending cases. The Court's refusal to find constitutional significance in the first and third of these features sounds convincing: why, the Court asked, should the constitutional
inquiry turn on an "empty phrase" such as "determines and directs," or
the shorthand use of a case name as a reference to the statutes that subsection (b)(6)(A) was intended to amend? 72 The same dismissive attitude about statutory format also informed the Court's response to the
argument grounded in the second feature: the Court "fail[ed] to appreciate the significance" of this argument since Congress might have modified the statutes directly, and since under either format, the result would
71
have been the same. Perhaps these responses do not persuasively explain why subsection (b)(6)(A) was a completely unexceptional use of
the legislative power, but they surely go some way toward explaining why
it was not clearly unconstitutional. In other words, these responses make
the completely valid point that the use of particular phrases, or even particular formats, should be considered only weak support for an argument
that the Supreme Court should overturn a statute.
But this analysis still leaves a nagging sense that something is wrong
with this statute. The Ninth Circuit seems to have had this sense, too,
when it opened its analysis with the observation that subsection
(b)(6)(A) specified particular cases.74 The suspicion seems to involve
Congress' intent, and the legitimacy of that intent. Nobody would seriously think that Congress decided to amend a particular set of statutes,
then looked around and happened to find a case in which all of those
statutes, but only those statutes, were alleged to have been violated, thus
providing a convenient shorthand. Instead, it is clear that Congress
wanted the named cases, and perhaps every other case dealing with these
particular forests, to be decided in favor of the government, as long as it
complied with section 318's new substantive provisions.
Thus understood, the Supreme Court's analysis finds a distant echo in
Ex Parte McCardle,75 another case in which a statute was clearly understood to have been aimed at a particular fact pattern, or even a •particular76
case, and yet was upheld. But the McCardle analogy is incomplete.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 439.
Id.
See Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1314.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
See id.

1999] The Line Between Statutory Amendment & Statutory Interpretation 1073

McCardle dealt with Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, a power explicitly given to Congress and one of its crucial
constitutionally-based checks on the federal courts.77 The statute in Rob-

ertson implicated no such checks. In fact, if anything, the statute at issue
in Robertson arguably threatened the checks and balances system by
usurping courts' fundamental power to decide cases according to their
own legal interpretations and factual findings." Moreover, the statute in
McCardle was evenhanded: the Court was stripped of jurisdiction in all
cases of a particular type, regardless of the outcome of the case in the
lower courts. By contrast, the statute in Robertson was clearly government-defendant friendly: after subsection (b)(6)(A), such a defendant
could violate a statute such as the MBTA and still prevail in court, as
long as9 it complied with the requirements of subsections (b)(3) and
(b)(5).
.
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit's suspicion seems at least to have been
acknowledged by the Supreme Court when it noted an amicus' argument
that even a statute that merely amends prior law may nevertheless be unconstitutional "if the change swept no more broadly, or little more
broadly, than the range of applications at issue in the pending cases." 8
The concern reflected in this argument-which the Court declined to
consider for procedural reasons" -seems to be quite similar to that expressed by the Ninth Circuit; namely, that such a statute would amount
to legislative decision of particular cases. This Article begins its own
analysis at this point of at least potential agreement between the two
courts; that is, the separation of powers implications of singling out individuals or individual cases. However, before reaching that analysis in
Part III, it is necessary to analyze the doctrinal issue explicitly relied on
by the Ninth Circuit; that is, the possible holding of United States v.
Klein82 that Congress may not prescribe results to courts.
II. SECTION 318 AND THE DICTATION OF FACTS OR RESULTS

In Robertson, the Ninth Circuit struck down section 318 on the ground
77. See id. at 507.
78. See Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438-39.
79. Cf.United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 372 (1980) (rejecting a
separation of powers challenge to a statute by which the United States waived a res judicata defense to a compensation claim made by an Indian tribe, when a previous lawsuit
had resulted in a judgment against the tribe, in large part based on Congress' power to pay
the debts incurred by the United States).
80. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441.
81. See id.
82. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
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that it compelled Article III courts "to reach a specific result and make
certain factual findings under existing law." 3 The Court thus contrasted
section 318 to a statute that merely altered the underlying law, which it
recognized was well within Congress' power. 84 This distinction reflects
the standard reading of Klein; however, as commentators85 and courts 6
have pointed out, it may not have been part of Klein's actual holding.
The Supreme Court read section 318 quite differently, concluding that it
did nothing more than amend the previously existing environmental
statutes at issue.g7 Based on this reading of the statute, the Court concluded that section 318 did not require the Court to consider the scope of
any such rule allegedly arising out of Klein. 8
This disagreement, not so much about Klein's meaning, but, instead
about the fundamental question whether Klein was even relevant reflects
the difficulty courts have had with the Klein decision. As many commentators have pointed out, Klein is a puzzling case. s 9 At least one thorough
study of Klein has concluded that its law changing/result directing analysis is dicta. 90 Other commentators have characterized the Klein analysis
as turning on the asymmetrical nature of the statute's manipulation of
federal jurisdiction," while others have focused on either the nature 92 or
83. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990).
84. Seeid. at 1315-16.
85. See, e.g., Young, supra note 69 at 1237-38 (stating that the Court in Klein failed to
"strike[] down a congressional attempt to interfere with the Court's evidentiaty or factfinding processes").
86. See, e.g., Rabin v. Fivzar Assocs., 801 F. Supp. 1045, 1053 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992);
United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 695 (4th Cir. 1982) (suggesting a narrower reading
of Klein).
87. See Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438.
88. See id. at 441.
89. See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War and
Reconstruction, 1865-1873, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 158 (1984); Samuel Estreicher, Congressional Power and ConstitutionalRights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333, 343 n.20 (1982); Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the
Rules EnablingAct, 46 MERCER L. REV. 733, 743 n.41 (1995); Martin H. Redish, Federal
JudicialIndependence: Constitutionaland PoliticalPerspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697,
718 (1995). For a thorough examination of Klein, see generally Young, supra note 69.
90. See generally Young, supra note 69.
91. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the
FederalCourts: An Exercise in Dialectic,66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372-74 (1953).
92. See, e.g., J. Richard Doidge, Is Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the Separation of Powers?: Rethinking United States v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 910, 959-64,
969-70 (1994) (suggesting the importance of the government's proprietary, as opposed to
regulatory, role in Klein, and on that basis, distinguishing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling and
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855), in which the Supreme Court upheld a
statute making a bridge a post road, even though the statute had the effect of nullifying a
judicial decree that the bridge was a public nuisance for interfering with navigation on the
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the constitutional status9 3 of the issue whose litigation was being precluded. Others have attempted to deal with the law changing/result directing issue more directly; for example, Professors Eisgruber and Sager
have characterized the Klein issue as one where Congress attempted to
''4
interfere with what they call the "institutional integrity of the courts. 1
Under their reading, the problem with the statute struck down in Klein
was that it made the courts Congress' "constitutional puppet"95 by directing the courts to articulate legal conclusions to which they do not
subscribe. 96 As already suggested, the reason scholars have had such difficulty with Klein is that this supposed distinction is inconsistent with a
fundamental feature of our governmental system: a legislature's ability to
write statutes that change the law, which then must be given effect by the
courts. 97 In a very real sense, any conventional statute "directs results,"
yet the enactment of statutes remains the quintessential legislative function.
Given the difficulty scholars have had understanding Klein, it is no
surprise that courts considering Klein challenges have failed to offer a
convincing explanation and application of the Klein rule. The analysis in
both of the Robertson opinions and in a number of other cases highlight
the difficulties inherent in this inquiry.
The law making/result directing distinction has emerged most frequently in cases challenging a 1991 amendment to the 1934 Securities
Act. Briefly, in 1991, the Supreme Court, in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
98 imposed a uniform limitations period
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,
for a particular implied right of action under the federal securities laws,
river traversed by the bridge); Young, supra note 69, at 1248 (distinguishing Klein from
Wheeling Bridge on the ground that Klein dealt with private rights, while Wheeling Bridge
dealt with public rights).
93. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 89, at 719-20 (suggesting that Klein turned on the fact
that Congress was usurping the President's pardon power when it purported to dictate to
the courts the effect to be given to pardons).
94. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 472 (1994).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 470-73.
97. The legislature's power to change the law includes the power to change it retroactively. In some cases, a statute's retroactivity may raise constitutional issues of due process, see infra note 172, and separation of powers. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514
U.S. 211, 240-46 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment), Justice Breyer considers the
effect of retroactivity on a separation-of-powers challenge to a federal law. See infra Part
III.B.1 (discussing Justice Breyer's singling out analysis in Plaut). For a detailed discussion of several separation-of-powers issues raised by retroactivity, see generally Doidge,
supra note 92.
98. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
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rejecting some lower court decisions that had applied the most analogous
state law period. 99 On the same day it decided Lampf, the Court held, in
° that a new rule of federal law
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,'O
applied to the parties in the case, announcing the rule must also be applied to all cases pending on direct review. 0' Thus, under the Beam rule,
the new limitations period in Lampf had to be applied retroactively to
any pending suits brought under the same cause of action. As a result of
Lampfs retroactive application, a number of pending-and highprofile-securities fraud suits, which had been considered timely before
Lampf, were rendered untimely and thus dismissed.
Congress responded to the retroactive application of the Lampf rule
by enacting section 27A of the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991.102 Section 27A effectively nullified Lampf s retroactivity by allowing a plaintiff
to reinstate, on motion, any suit filed before the Lampf decision provided it was timely under the limitations period then controlling, and had
been dismissed as time-barred on the authority of Lampf. Ultimately,
the Supreme Court struck down section 27A on the ground that it violated Article III of the Constitution by directing federal courts to reinstate suits that had proceeded to final judgment.'3 Before the Supreme
Court's decision, however, a large number of lower federal courts considered a separate ground for striking the statute. These courts found
that section 27A violated the Klein rule by compelling them to reach certain results, without changing the underlying law.1 4
These courts' opinions illustrate the extreme difficulty attendant in applying the distinction made in Klein. Most courts concluding that section
27A did not violate the Klein distinction did so without much analysis,
finding simply that the statute imposed a new limitations period for preLampf cases, and noting that Congress has the power to set limitations
periods for such lawsuits.' 5 Courts that reached the opposite conclusion,

99. See id. at 361-62.
100. 501 U.S. 529 (1991).
101. See id. at 540.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1994).
103. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995).
104. Theoretically, at least, section 27A remains in force to the extent that it does not
purport to require federal courts to reopen final judgments. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1. The
retroactive application of the pre-Lampfrule would thus continue to have force in lawsuits
that had not reached final judgment, for example, those pending on appeal, or those which
had never been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. Thus, the Klein question
raised by these courts remains open despite the Supreme Court's decision in Plaut.
105. See, e.g., Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 971 F.2d 1567, 1571-73 (11th Cir.
1992); Lundy v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 794 F. Supp. 346, 347-50 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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however, employed unsatisfactory methods to distinguish legitimate legislative power from illegitimate judicial direction found in section 27A.
At least three courts adopted an extremely formalistic analysis, concluding that section 27A did not change the underlying law because on its
face it simply instructed the courts not to apply Lampf retroactively'O°
These courts viewed that instruction not as amending the Lampf rule,
but instead, merely and unconstitutionally, directing that courts not apply it in certain cases.
These courts' conclusions appear to rest on two related bases. First,
they focus on section 27A's format, namely, that it phrases its rule by expressly commanding, for pre-Lampf cases, a return to pre-Lampf law (as
opposed, presumably, to a statute that announced a particular limitations
period).' 07 The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
asserted that section 27A represents an "interpretive rule,"'' 8 and suggested that "interpretation" is a function assigned to the courts, not the
legislature.'9 This analysis, standing alone, is clearly vulnerable to the
Robertson Court's analysis of section 318; in that case, the Supreme
Court concluded that Congress' power to impose a particular rule means

106. See, e.g., In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 110, 114 (W.D. Mich. 1992);
Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 1092, 1094-98 (D. Colo.
1992); In re Brichard Sec. Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098,1103-04 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
107. See, e.g., Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097. The Bank of Denver court reasoned that:
[i]n response [to Lampfj, Congress did not retroactively amend [section 10(b) of
the Securities Act] to state an express limitations period. Rather, Congress selected a discrete category of federal cases, those pending on [the date Lampf was
decided], and directed federal courts hearing these cases to ignore the Supreme
Court's binding interpretation of § 10(b) set out in Lampf. Congress thus effectively acted as a "super-appellate court," overturning Lampf without replacing
that decision with any new law.
...If Congress' purpose was to change the law, it could have enacted a retroactive express statute of limitations .... Instead, by selecting a discrete body of
pending actions for special treatment under § [27A], Congress demonstrated that
its sole purpose was to nullify the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 10(b)
without amending § 10(b) itself. In so doing, Congress usurped the power set
aside to the judiciary by the Constitution.
Id.; see also Brichard,788 F. Supp. at 1103-04. The Brichardcourt concluded that:
[t]he language of the statute and its legislative history demonstrate ... that section 27A did not change the underlying Lampf rule. The section itself does not
codify Lampf. Nor does it enact a statute of limitations different from the one
announced in Lampf. The limitations periods of Lampf are impliedly approved
by Congress' taking no action to codify or change those rules. Instead, on its
face, section 27A only limits the retroactive application of those periods.
Id.
108. Bank of Denver, 789 F. Supp. at 1097.
109. See id.
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that the format chosen by Congress to express that rule should not have
constitutional implications.110 Even without embracing Robertson's
broad deference to legislative format, the distinction drawn by these
courts appears somewhat tenuous. Nothing prohibits Congress from expressing the content of a rule by reference to a previous court decision,"'
a pending court case, or even to current or future state laws." 2 Forcing
Congress to state the actual substance of the rule, as opposed to allowing
it to incorporate it by reference, seems extremely formalistic.
One court offered a more abstract version of this rationale. It concluded that section 27A did not constitute a change in law because it
merely "overturn[ed] a decision of the Supreme Court [i.e., LampJ] interpreting the unchanged language of § 10(b).... 3 For this court, a key
factor in its Klein analysis seems to have been that section 27A did not
directly change the language of the underlying securities law, and thus
could be seen only as overruling a judicial interpretation of the statute.
This analysis suggests that the underlying law, here section 10(b), implicitly includes a limitations period, one "found" by the Court in Lampf.
Congress was, of course, free to change that limitations period. In order
to do so, however, it would have had to explicitly insert one into the

110. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1992). But see
Johnston v. Cigna Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1098, 1101-02 (D. Co. 1992). The Johnston court
distinguished section 27A from section 318, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Robertson, on the ground that
[i]n [Robertson] Congress enacted a statute which essentially provided that compliance with the new provisions would constitute compliance with several other
previously existing statutes. In effect, Congress rewrote its own statutory framework. In stark contrast, § [27A] attempts to overturn a decision of the Supreme
Court interpreting the unchanged language of § 10(b).
Id.
111. See, e.g., Rabin v. Fivzar Assoc., 801 F. Supp. 1045,1053-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). According to the Rabin court:
Though the defendants argue that the absence of provision for an express statute
of limitations applicable retroactively defeats the conclusion that the law has
been "changed," neither they nor any of the cases they cite supply a rationale for
holding that a change to a rule that finds its substance in the laws of the circuits is
any less a change than one that proclaims a uniform limitations period.
Id.
112. For example, the statute at issue in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) 299 (1851), incorporated into federal law all regulations that states had enacted or
would thereafter enact dealing with harbor pilots. See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. IX, § 4, 1
Stat. 54 ("That all pilots in the bays ... of the United States shall continue to be regulated
in conformity with the existing laws of the States respectively wherein such pilots may be,
or with such laws as the States may respectively hereafter enact for the purpose, until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress.").
113. Johnston, 789 F. Supp. at 1102.
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law.'1 There is a clearly discernible link between this analysis and the
Colorado district court's conclusion' that section 27A constitutes an "interpretive rule" as opposed to a change in the underlying law.
This conception has some intuitive appeal: if the Court in Lampf did in
fact "find" a limitations period implicit in section 10(b), then Congress
may not simply "overturn" that interpretation by fiat, but must do something that, in some formal sense, "amends" section 10(b). This conception fits neatly into Klein's purported distinction between changing the
underlying law and directing results under previous law. Moreover, it is
consistent with Professors Eisgruber's and Sager's concept of "institutional integrity, ' .6 to the extent that section 27A can be viewed as Congress second-guessing the courts on a matter of statutory interpretation.
The problem, however, lies in the fact that there is really no good way
to determine whether section 27A really did amend the underlying law.
Indeed, in a very real sense there is no distinction between these two
possibilities: if lawmaking is the power to create liability rules and the
procedural structure for enforcing those rules, then overturning a statutory interpretation and amending the underlying statute both constitute
lawmaking because they both have this effect. As one influential judicial
opinion noted, "the prescription of general rules of substantive law lies at
the heart of the legislative function, and courts are obliged to apply the
positive law in effect at the time of the judgment.', 1 7 Through section
27A Congress simply required that the limitations period for cases filed
pre-Lampf be decided under the pre-Lampf rule, namely, the most
analogous state law limitations period. It is thus quite difficult to conclude that, on its face, section 27A directed results as opposed to changing underlying law.
Perhaps recognizing this difficulty, courts employing a Klein rationale
for striking down section 27A have also relied on the fact that section
27A did not entirely repeal Lampf, but instead merely limited its effect
to lawsuits filed after the date it was handed down. "' Indeed, one of
114. See Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 562, 565-66 (D. Colo.
1992) (noting that in enacting section 27A, Congress acted as a "super-appellate court" by
overturning Lampf without establishing any new law).
115. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing Bank of Denver v. Southeastern CapitalGroup, 789 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1992)). The same judge, District Judge
Babcock, decided both Johnston and Bank of Denver.
116. See generally Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 94.
117. United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 695 (4th Cir. 1982) (citing PAUL BATOR
ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 316
n.4 (2d ed. 1973)).
118. See In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 802 F. Supp. 110, 114 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (asserting
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these opinions uses section 27A's legislative history to demonstrate that
Congress was well aware of the targets of this exemption, namely, several
high-profile (and, in 1991, very unpopular) financiers-securities lawsuit
defendants who stood to benefit from retroactive application of Lampf.1 9
These courts' rationale appears to be that section 27A did not change the
underlying law because Congress exempted only a particular class of
cases from Lampfs interpretation of that law. This analysis, however,
does not provide a logical link between this classification or singling-out
concern and the concerns surrounding Klein-type direction of results,
aside from the obvious suspicion that Congress may have wanted to "direct results" by ensuring that certain individuals not be allowed to escape
securities fraud liability on a technicality such as the untimeliness of the
lawsuit. This type of "result direction", however, does not appear any
different from that which would occur if Congress created new, even retroactive, liability that effectively targeted only a small class of individuals. There may certainly be equal protection problems with that sort of
targeting,
and such targeting may even raise separation of powers con120
cerns. However, realistically, the problem cannot be that Congress has
unconstitutionally directed a result.
Klein issues have also arisen more recently, though with no more analytical clarity, in opinions considering challenges to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA).' 1 The PLRA requires federal courts, on a
defendant's motion, to terminate previously-granted prospective relief
that Congress did not effect a change in law through section 27A because under that statute, the previous statute of limitations period continues; stating that section 27A instead
"merely denies retroactive application of the Lampf limitations period); Bank of Denver,
789 F. Supp. at 1097-98 (holding that "Congress usurped the power set aside to the judiciary by the Constitution" by targeting several pending actions for legislative treatment under section 27A; finding that section 27A violates the doctrine of separation of powers because it only applies to cases pending on the date Lampf was decided.); see also Rosenthal,
811 F. Supp. at 565 (same, quoting Bank of Denver); Johnston, 789 F. Supp. at 1102 (distinguishing Robertson on the ground that section 27A serves only to "overturn a Supreme
Court decision with which Congress did not agree," while section 318 has "general, prospective application, effecting a comprehensive set of rules to govern timber harvesting
within a geographically and temporally limited domain").
The court in Brichard suggested that it would have approved a statute that applied
equally to cases filed both before and after the Lampf decision. See In re Brichard Sec.
Litig., 788 F. Supp. 1098, 1104 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("Without deciding the question, the
court believes that if Congress had enacted a statute of limitations period for private
§ 10(b)-5 actions and had commanded that the new statute was to apply retroactively,
Congress would not have overstepped its legislative power.").
119. See Brichard,788 F. Supp. at 1105-06; see also Rospatch, 802 F. Supp. at 115.
120. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the "singling out" rationale offered by Justice
Breyer in Plaut for striking down section 27A).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994 & Supp. II).
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correcting illegal prison conditions, unless the court made or now makes
findings that such relief is the minimum necessary to correct a legal violation.12 2 Further, such relief is to be stayed automatically within thirty
days of the defendant's motion, although the stay can be extended to
ninety days for good cause. 12 Prospective relief need not terminate if the
to correct a current and ongoing violation of
relief "remains necessary
124
the Federal right.,
Inmates resisting prisons' motions to terminate relief-usually through
a consent decree-have challenged the PLRA on a number of grounds.
Most importantly for our purposes, inmates have argued that the termination and automatic stay provisions violate Klein by prescribing a rule
of decision. Most courts have rejected this argument, 125 although a Ninth
Circuit panel struck the termination provision on this ground"' and at
least one district court has accepted a similar argument to strike down
the automatic stay provision.2 7 Under the majority view, the statute satisfies Klein because it changes the underlying law, defined as the district
court's power to grant equitable relief in this class of cases.'2 Although
its opinion was later withdrawn, a Ninth Circuit panel questioned this
129
analysis in Taylor v. United States, suggesting that the relevant "under122. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2)-(3).
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)-(3).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).
125. See, e.g., Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998); Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th
Cir. 1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2460
(1997).
126. See Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, 158 F.3d 159 (9th
Cir. 1998), and on reh'g en banc aff d on other grounds, 1999 WL 402748 (9th Cir. June 18,
1999).
127. See Ruiz v. Scott, No. CIV.A.H.-78-987, 1996 WL 932104, *17 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
A number of district courts have struck down the automatic stay provision on the related,
but distinct, rule prohibiting congressional reopenings of final judgments. See Hadix, 947
F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996), rev'd, 133 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1998); Glover v. Johnson,
957 F. Supp. 110 (E.D. Mich. 1997). At least two district courts have held that the same
anti-reopening rule is violated by the termination provision. See Taylor v. Arizona, 972 F.
Supp. 1239, 1243-45 (D. Az. 1997), affd sub nom. Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178
(9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 158 F.3d 159 (9th Cir. 1998), and on reh'g en banc affd on
other grounds, 1999 WL 402748 (9th Cir. June 18, 1999); Gavin v. Ray, No. 4-78-CV-70062,
1996 WL 622556, **2-3 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 18, 1996), rev'd sub nom. Gavin v. Branstad, 122
F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997). The relative popularity of this latter ground for striking down
the PLRA may be attributable to the fact that the Supreme Court in Plaut employed this
ground to strike down section 27A, while declining to reach the broader Klein argument
that some lower courts had employed to reach the same result.
128. See, e.g., Hadix, 133 F.3d at 943; Inmates, 129 F.3d at 658; Plyler, 100 F.3d at 372.
129. 143 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 158 F.3d 159 (9th Cir. 1998), and on
reh'g en banc affd on other grounds, 1999 WL 402748 (9th Cir. June 18, 1999). A majority
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lying law" was not the law granting the district court particular remedial
powers, but instead the constitutional provisions underlying the plaintiffs' legal claims."" This disagreement is significant when the underlying
legal claim rests on the Constitution: since simple legislation cannot alter
the Constitution, courts' willingness to allow Congress to alter the scope
of available remedies inevitably affects the ease and completeness with
which constitutional rights can be vindicated.'3 ' However, when the legal
claim is based on a statutory right, the disagreement over the PLRA becomes less significant, because the legal right itself would be subject to
congressional alteration. 2
A distinct set of objections to the PLRA centers on the statute's effect
on courts' functioning. In Taylor, the Ninth Circuit panel relied on the

of the Ninth Circuit en banc panel held that the constitutional question did not have to be
addressed because the state was asking for modification of an interlocutory judgment that
had already expired, and thus was essentially asking for the wrong relief. See 1999 WL
402748, at *1. A plurality of the panel nevertheless discussed the constitutional issue, in
response to the dissent's constitutional analysis. See id. at *6-*9. The plurality concluded
that the judgment from which the state was requesting relief was a final judgment that featured no ongoing judicial supervision, and thus, that it would violate the "anti-reopening
of final judgments" rule to apply the PLRA to this particular judgment. See id. Having
expressed its constitutional doubts based on the "anti-reopening" rule, the en banc plurality did not reach the Klein issue. References in the text to Taylor are to the original threejudge panel opinion, whose constitutional analysis is not the current law in the Ninth Circuit, given the withdrawal of the that opinion. See 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1998) (withdrawing panel opinion); see also 9TH CIR. R 35-3(5) (providing that where an en banc
court orders than an opinion be withdrawn, "that opinion shall not be regarded as precedent and shall not be cited in either briefs or oral argument to the Ninth Circuit or any district court in the Ninth Circuit"). Although the panel opinion has been withdrawn, it provides a good example of how a federal court confronted with Klein issues has dealt with
them.
130. See Taylor, 143 F.3d at 1183. The Taylor panel reasoned that:
Congress did not somehow change the applicable law by altering the permissibility of certain types of consent decrees, for the only relevant inquiry is whether it
changed the substantive law upon which the parties' consent decree and, more
important, the district court's judgment was based. In this case, it clearly did not.
Id.
131. It should be noted that the PLRA does not purport to divest federal courts' of all
remedial power when dealing with prison conditions-based violations of constitutional
rights; indeed, the statute specifically authorizes the continuance of such relief when courts
find it necessary to vindicate those rights. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3)(1994 & Supp. II); see
also Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 169-70 n.11 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that is unnecessary to decide whether Congress has the power to eliminate all federal jurisdiction in a
particular area, because the PLRA allowed continued use of injunctive relief to vindicate
federal rights).
132. Cf.System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employes' Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642
(1961) (requiring that courts not continue to enforce previously-imposed injunctive relief
after Congress altered the substantive law underlying that relief).
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mandatory language of the termination provision

and the likely ab

sence of any of the conditions creating an exception to the termination
requirement, to conclude that the provision constituted an unconstitutional legislative direction of a result. 34 The court used similar arguments to find fault with the automatic stay provision. It noted that a
court faced with a motion to terminate a consent decree would probably
not be in a position to make the findings required to continue enforcing
the decree, because there would probably be no record to furnish the basis for such findings.' It also concluded that the automatic stay provision's ninety day clock did not provide enough time for courts to make
13
the findings the statute required for the pre-existing relief to continue. 1
Based on these observations, the court concluded that the automatic stay
provision effectively directs courts to stay previously-granted relief; as
the Ninth Circuit panel put it, the ostensible exceptions to the termina13' 7
tion requirement "provide[] no room for judicial decision-making.'
This analysis points toward a pragmatic understanding of the Klein
rule-of-decision prohibition. It asks, given the realities of a particular
type of judicial proceeding (say, entry of a consent decree in a complex
institutional reform litigation), whether congressional regulation purports to allow a role for judicial discretion (for example, to make findings), but actually forces a particular result with little or no room for that
discretion.'38 By contrast, courts upholding the termination and auto133. The termination provision reads as follows:
In any civil action with respect to prison conditions, a defendant or intervener
shall be entitled to the immediate termination of any prospective relief if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation
of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2).
134. See Taylor, 143 F.3d 1178, 1184 ("Congress directed the outcome of this case and
similarly situated pre-PLRA consent decrees .... Because the decrees are issued upon
consent, no findings of the sort required by § 3626(b)(2) were made, nor would they necessarily have been made, even in a contested case, given the absence in 1973 of such specific requirements.") (citation omitted).
135. See id. at 1184-85 (stating that "the court cannot now make the findings required
by 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(b)(3), because no record was made. One of the normal purposes of
consent to the judicial decree is to avoid making a record which would lead to such findings.").
136. See id. at 1185; see also Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100, 1364 (E.D. Mich.
1996).
137. Taylor, 143 F.3d at 1184.
138. Thus, this understanding of Klein goes beyond the more formalistic understanding embraced by the courts that struck down § 27A on the grounds that it simply instructed lower courts not to apply the Supreme Court's Lampf decision. See supra note
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matic stay provisions adopted a more formalistic approach. These courts
noted that the statute left courts ostensibly with the task of applying the
statute, for example, determining whether the required findings had been
made originally, or determining whether those findings could now be
made. These courts acknowledged that the task may be difficult, given
the PLRA's time constraints and other practical difficulties, but concluded that the statute satisfied Klein by leaving formal judicial authority
with courts. 39
The Taylor panel's objections to the PLRA, and the pragmatic understanding of Klein they reflect, find a distant echo in that same court's
analysis, several years earlier, in Robertson. Just as Taylor found unconstitutional interference with the courts in a statute that directed an outcome absent findings that were unlikely to exist and that could not be
made within the time allotted by the statute, so too the Ninth Circuit's
Robertson opinion found fault with a statute that required findings that
seemed simply incorrect as an empirical matter. Recall that section 318
"determine[d] and direct[ed]" that compliance with its new forest management requirements constituted "adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements" alleged to have been violated in the Robertson litigation. The Ninth Circuit's testing of this
language against Klein focused, quite sensibly, on the fact that those underlying statutes imposed particular requirements whose satisfaction or
violation could be determined as an empirical matter. For example, the
106 and accompanying text. Taylor suggests that the problem is not simply with a legislative directive to a court to take certain action (for example, "reopen cases that you had
dismissed on the authority of Lampf'). Instead, the problem is with a directive that purports to authorize the court to use its adjudicative skills (for example, to make findings)
but then fails to give the courts adequate opportunity to adjudicate. So understood, Taylor's understanding of Klein is clearly related to Eisgruber's and Sager's conception of the
courts' "institutional integrity." See supra note 94 and accompanying text. Under Taylor's
analysis, the PLRA usurps that integrity not by commanding the courts to articulate legal
conclusions to which they do not subscribe, but instead by purporting to capture the prestige and legitimacy of a judicial proceeding that in fact is not allowed to take place.
139. See, e.g., Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1089 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Congress has
left the judicial functions of interpreting the law and applying the law to the facts entirely
in the hands of the courts. The PLRA leaves the judging to judges, and therefore it does
not violate the Klein doctrine."); Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397, 404 (N.D.
Ind. 1997) ("It is important that section 3626 does not mandate the courts to terminate
cases without review by the courts. The section only establishes the standards to follow;
the court itself, and not Congress, determines whether a constitutional violation exists and
what is necessary to remedy such violation."); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 351
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997) (characterizing
section 3626 as restricting courts' discretion but asserting that courts nonetheless "will continue to define the scope of prisoners' constitutional rights, review the factual record, apply the judicially determined constitutional standards to the facts as they are found in the
record and determine what relief is necessary to remedy the constitutional violations.")
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court noted that one of the underlying statutes, the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act,140 required the Government to use "principles of
multiple use and sustained yield" and a "systemic interdisciplinary approach" when managing federal lands.' Determination of whether the
Government complied with these requirements could be made by the
court's examination of facts about the Government's actual management
of those lands. Section 318, however, arguably short-circuited that process by requiring a finding that compliance with section 318's requirements constituted compliance with those statutes. Surely, if any statute
compels findings under existing law, then the Ninth Circuit demonstrated
that section 318 does. 42
Thus, the Klein analysis in both Taylor and the Ninth Circuit's Robertson opinion respond to similar concerns about the proper functioning of
courts as institutions independent from the legislature. Under this conception of Klein, courts are bound to apply the law created by the legislature. Their procedural machinery, however, cannot be invoked in a way
that either formally leaves room for judicial discretion while realistically
excluding the possibility of such discretion (Taylor), or requires a court
to reach legal conclusions at odds with the court's own understanding of
reality (Robertson).

Of course, the Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit's reading of section 318, holding that section 318 simply changed
the underlying law. As noted above, 43 the Court's conclusion responds
to a common-sense conception that constitutional issues concerning the
scope of Congress' legislative power should not turn on purely format issues. Simply put, since Congress had the power to amend the underlying
environmental statutes by including in each of them an alternative means
of compliance (here, by satisfying section 318's forest management requirements), why should the constitutional line be based on the format
that Congress uses to impose these alternative means?'"
140. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784
(1994).
141. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1)-(2) (1994)
142. Cf. Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting
that the Supreme Court's opinion in "Robertson indicates a high degree of judicial tolerance for an act of Congress that is intended to affect litigation so long as it changes the underlying substantive law in any detectable way.").
143. See supra Part I.C (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis of section 318 in Robertson).
144. This is not to suggest that Congress could alter legislatively-granted rights and
direct that such alterations be given effect to cases that have already proceeded to final
judgment. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995), the Supreme Court condemned such attempts as unconstitutional legislative interference with the judiciary. What
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The Supreme Court's conclusion is supported by precedent suggesting
that, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's analysis, Congress can in fact
dictate relationships between empirical events and legal conclusions.
First, the Court, in Tot v. United States145 recognized Congress' power to
prescribe evidentiary presumptions based "upon a view of relation between the fact actually shown and the fact presumed broader than that a
jury might take in a specific case. ,146 The Tot Court did note that this
power did not extend to presumptions where there was "no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the
inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack
of connection between the two in common experience. 1 47 However, the
Court grounded this limitation in the due process clause.'
Employing
due process rather than separation of powers here makes sense, because
a presumption's rationality, or lack thereof, does not affect the degree of
legislative intrusion into the judicial domain, the heart of the separation
of powers concern with section 318. 141
Congress has similarly broad power to define statutory terms, even if
the definition differs from the ordinary meaning of those words.5 Federal courts have been generous in construing this power. For example, in
Ace Waterways, Inc. v. Fleming, ' a district court enforced a congressional amendment of a statute that expanded the definition of "steam
vessel," from "every vessel propelled in whole or in part by steam" to include "[e]very vessel... propelled in whole or in part by steam or by any
is significant for our purposes, however, is that Plaut recognized this type of interference
as analytically distinct from Klein-condemned legislative attempts to dictate a rule of decision to the courts. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (noting the distinction between these two issues). The PLRA cases also note this distinction, by treating the Klein and Plaut arguments as two distinct separation of powers arguments. See, e.g., Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1085
(distinguishing between the Klein and Plaut arguments); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365,
371-72 (same).
145. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
146. See id. at 468.
147. Id. at 467-68 (footnote omitted).
148. See id. at 467; see also id. at 473 (Black, J., concurring) (basing his concurrence on
the requirements of due process).
149. But cf.Sager & Eisgruber, supra note 94, at 470-73 (arguing that the Klein statute
suffered a separation of powers flaw because it forced courts to reach legal conclusions to
which they did not subscribe).
150. See 1A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.08, at 90
(5th ed. 1993). The challenges to statutory definitions deal with their linguistic rationality,
not with whether the classifications they impose violate equal protection. Cf, e.g., Federal
Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 310-13 (1993) (upholding statute's definition of "cable system" under the rational-basis standard embodied
in the Due Process Clause's equal protection component).
151. 98 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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'
other form of mechanical or electrical power."152
Despite the court's recognition of the resulting statute's Alice-in-Wonderland quality,153 it gave
effect to the definition, with an analysis as sweeping as it was curt: "Congress[,]" the court stated, "has a right to legislate by definition if it

chooses. ,154
It is logical that Congress should have the same broad power to define
statutory terms that it has over evidentiary presumptions, since such presumptions, especially if irrebuttable, have exactly the same effect on
courts as if the statute had explicitly defined a term to incorporate the
presumed conclusion. Indeed, the Supreme Court has made a similar
point. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,'55 the Court considered a
statute that required mining companies to pay benefits to miners who
were "totally disabled," and enacted an "irrebuttable presumption" that
affliction with a certain disease constituted "total disability." The Court
rejected a due process claim that the presumption denied companies the
right to present evidence on whether a miner with that particular disease
was in fact "totally disabled." It pointed out that Congress could have
achieved the same result by writing the statute to require explicitly compensation to miners suffering that particular disease (as opposed to using
two steps: first, granting the right to "totally disabled" miners and, second, enacting a presumption that a particular disease constituted "total
disability"). The court refused to consider as relevant Congress' decision
to achieve the desired result by use of an evidentiary presumption, stating that "we do not think that Congress' choice of statutory language can
invalidate the enactment when its operation and effect are clearly permissible."'56
Given the degree of leeway reflected in these cases, the Supreme
Court's deference to Congress' choice of format in section 318 appears
less extraordinary. If Congress can write a statute that defines "steam
vessels" to include vessels not propelled by steam,'57 it should be able to
write a statute that, as the Robertson Court observed, effectively
amended each of the underlying environmental statutes by offering the
government a new, alternative, means of compliance, even though this

152. See id. at 667; Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 100 § 1, 16 Stat. 440, amended by Act of
June 13, 1933, ch. 61, 48 Stat. 125, codified at 46 U.S.C. § 361, repealed by Act of Aug. 26,
1983, Pub. L. 98-89, § 4(b), 97 Stat. 599.
153. See Ace Waterways, 98 F. Supp. at 667.

154. Id.
155.

428 U.S. 1 (1976).

156. Id. at 23-24.
157.

See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
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new means was not a formal amendment to the underlying statutes, and
even though the substantive statutory provision, as read in the United
States Code, remained seemingly unamended. Thus, while there may be
legitimate Klein-based concerns with legislative manipulation of judicial
processes (the concern identified by the Taylor panel),158 the Ninth Circuit's concern in Robertson-that legislatures be limited in their ability to
manipulate the substantive relationships between empirical findings and
legal conclusions-does not fare so well. Instead, this latter concern encounters a great deal of eminently logical precedent suggesting that Congress has broad power to prescribe those relationships and to do so in
whatever manner it chooses.
All told an examination of the Klein rule in cases dealing with statutory claims" 9 leads to Judge Calabresi's exasperated conclusion, expressed in the Second Circuit's PLRA opinion:
Whether a statute provides only the standard to which courts
must adhere or compels the result that they must reach can be a
vexed question in cases in which, as a practical matter, simple
adherence to the "new" standard in effect mandates a particular
result. Such cases may be plausibly characterized either as validly leading the court to reach a different outcome as a result of
a change in the underlying law or as unconstitutionally imposing a different outcome under the previous law16°
Thus, the difficulty courts have had drawing a line between result direction and law changing, ' the ambiguity as to whether Klein actually
established this line,"' and the broad reading courts have given to congressional power to prescribe factual presumptions and definitions,163 to-

158. This is not to suggest that Taylor's analysis is trouble-free. One problem that
arises immediately is the difficulty of determining exactly when a time limit restrains unconstitutionally judicial ability to act. For a thorough discussion of this issue, including the
possible applicability of Klein, see United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 694-99 (4th Cir.
1982).
159. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (suggesting the special problem
posed by constitutional claims).
160. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 174 (2d Cir. 1997). Tellingly, Judge
Calabresi followed up this statement with a citation directing readers to compare the
Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Robertson. See id.
161. See supra notes 98-143 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1570 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that section 27A satisfies "whatever is left of the Klein test"); Brainer,691 F.2d at 695
(suggesting inherent tension in any possible Klein holding limiting Congress' ability to prescribe rules of decision to courts); Young, supra note 69, at 1233-38 (suggesting that Klein
did not include a holding about fact dictation).
163. See supra notes 145-154 and accompanying text (discussing the presumption in
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468 (1943), and Ace Waterways, Inc. v. Fleming, 98 F.
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gether place a heavy burden on those who would find a separation of
powers flaw in section 318's seeming usurpation of the judicial function.
Discussion of the two Robertson opinions brings us full circle. The
above analysis suggests that Klein's distinction between law-making and
fact or result-directing does not by itself furnish a satisfying means for
evaluating the initial intuition that something is wrong with section 318.
When considered against the Supreme Court's Robertson analysis and
other examples of legislative power to prescribe relationships between
fact and law, the judicial opinions concerning section 27A and the
PLRA, and the Ninth Circuit's Robertson opinion, seem to lack logical
standards for distinguishing between legitimate legislative law-changing
and illegitimate legislative result-prescribing. As suggested above, these
difficulties cast doubt on any attempt to apply Klein to regulatory issues
otherwise within Congress' legislative power.164
In short, Klein's distinction between law-making versus fact or resultdirecting fails to provide a clear model for evaluating statutes such as section 318. But rejection of the Klein analysis does not quell the unease
raised by section 318, which led to the examination of Klein's applicability in the first place. Is there another way to analyze the trouble with
Robertson?
III. SINGLING OUT

A. Introduction
The line the Ninth Circuit drew in Robertson between normal congressional legislating and inappropriate congressional result-directing parallels the distinction between the tasks appropriate for a majoritarian institution, such as Congress, and a non-majoritarian institution, such as a
court. As a general rule, majoritarian institutions enact rules that apply
generally to society, while courts apply those rules to individual litigants. The political science insight behind this division is neither novel
Supp. 666, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), that Congress has broad power to prescribe legal and factual findings).
164. This conclusion does not leave Klein without any effect. Instead, it continues to
limit congressional ability to interfere with judicial consideration of issues falling with another branch's constitutional responsibility, such as, the pardon power that was at issue in

Klein.
165. Of course, this is a simplification. Sometimes judicial decisions affect broad
classes of individuals, either through devices such as class actions, or by the enunciation of
a legal rule applicable to a broad class of individuals, as happens, for example, when the
Supreme Court interprets a statutory or constitutional provision. Conversely, legislative
acts sometimes affect only a small class of individuals. Nevertheless, the authority for federal courts to hand down broad-ranging decisions stems from their constitutional power to
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nor difficult to grasp. By requiring legislatures to act generally, rather
than particularly, the rule minimizes the chance of oppressive legislation,
as it ensures that everyone in a particular class will be affected by the
legislature's rule. 6 6 Similarly, assignment of the law application function
to courts ensures an unbiased, equal application of the general rule to individuals by a politically-insulated institution. Ideally, a politically accountable legislature enacts broad policy applicable to all similarly situated parties, with politically neutral courts ensuring that the legislative
policy is applied equally and fairly to all parties.' 67 This model of government finds expression in a number of constitutional provisions that
attempt to ensure that Congress and state legislatures limit themselves to
the enactment of generally applicable rules. The most notable of these
provisions is, of course, the Equal Protection Clause;6 but also speaking
9 Ex Post Facto,170 and
to this concern are the Bill of Attainder, 16917
Privi-

hear cases and controversies between two parties. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498-502 (1975) (discussing the requirement of standing for justiciability). Conversely, constitutional safeguards exist to guard against inappropriate singling-out by the legislature.
See infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text (listing bases for constitutional challenges to
statutes that single out the targets of legislation).
166. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that society's salvation from abuse by the
legislature "is the Equal Protection Clause, which requires the democratic majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me"); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that to ensure against arbitrary and unreasonable government, laws must be applied
generally because "nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow
those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus
to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were
affected"); see also 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 9.4, at 34-35 (3d ed. 1994) (arguing that this same insight explains the
rejection of the "bitter with the sweet" theory of procedural due process, under which
government has the power not only to create property interests in government benefits
but also to prescribe the procedure for individuals to contest a deprivation of that interest).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445 (1965) (noting, for example,
that the Bill of Attainder Clause "reflect[s] the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch
is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon
the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons");
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) ("It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those
rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments.").
168. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. While the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies only against the states, the Supreme Court has found in the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment an equal protection principle applicable
against the federal government. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
169. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
170. Id.
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leges and Immunities.7 Clauses.

Analogously, the Constitution reflects

the judicial role sketched above through its limitation of the judicial
power to "cases and controversies" in which a plaintiff must show some
particularized injury caused by the defendant's action. 73
The existence of these provisions, and of the model they reflect, obviously does not resolve particular questions about the proper use of the
legislative power. It is a fundamental characteristic of legislation that it
classifies, either by favoring or disfavoring particular conduct, whose performers thereby become a class, or by identifying pre-existing classes for
favorable or unfavorable treatment. The question then becomes the legitimacy of the classification-i.e., is it driven by real differences of relevant characteristics, or is it an attempt at illegitimate singling out, and
who has the authority to make that determination? Indeed, it is not necessarily inconsistent with this model for the legislature to create a class
consisting of one person.'74 This possibility indicates that the constitutionality of a statutory classification cannot be determined solely by a
mechanical inquiry into the size or scope of the affected class, although
these characteristics together may play an important role in the constitutional decision. Is there a test for the appropriateness of legislative classification decisions?

171. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 1.
172. In addition, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses prohibit
arbitrary or irrational retroactive application of statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Sperry
Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1989); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467
U.S. 717, 728-31 (1984); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1976).
173. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court relied on a
version of this distinction to hold that a provision allowing citizens to bring private suits
under the Endangered Species Act did not suffice to provide Article III standing.to a
plaintiff in the absence of a particularized injury suffered by that plaintiff. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571-78 (1992). In reaching this conclusion, Justice
Scalia, on behalf of the Court, expressed the concern that such an expansion of standing
would allow the courts to oversee the executive's administration of the laws--normally
subject only to political checks-without the motivating force of an injured plaintiff seeking the courts' assistance for redress. See id. at 576-78. Commentators have disputed this
understanding of the judicial role. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166-68 (1992) (arguing that Article III's "case or controversy" limitation should not be read as limiting
Congress' power to authorize courts to hear lawsuits where the plaintiff has not suffered a
concrete, particularized injury).
174. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473-84 (1977) (rejecting bill of attainder challenge to a statute addressed only to the Presidential Papers of
President Richard Nixon); see also Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(upholding agency use of rulemaking, rather than adjudication, procedure despite the fact
that the regulation affected only one entity); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301,
1306-07 (10th Cir. 1973) (same).
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B. Singling Out as a Separationof Powers Issue
The problem of legislative singling out is normally addressed under
Equal Protection Clause analysis, that is, through an inquiry into whether
the classification drawn by the legislature satisfies the appropriate level
of scrutiny. In a narrow category of cases, the constitutional inquiry is
addressed by the Bill of Attainder Clause, which asks a similar question. At times, however, the singling out concern is addressed through
the concept of separation of powers. As might be expected, these situations arise when Congress singles out in a way that appears to suggest a
usurpation of the judicial function. Since this is the salient concern with
section 318, this Article first examines singling out through the prism of
separation of powers.
176
Commentators and courts 177 noted the importance of the separation
of powers principle as a means of protecting individuals, just as such protection is afforded through more direct means such as the Equal Protection and Bill of Attainder Clauses. Of course, often there is no individual right clearly at stake in a separation of powers dispute. For example,
a case considering the constitutionality of a deficit-reduction statute that
gave quasi-executive power to an individual under the control of Congress might implicate the separation of powers principle without directly
raising concerns about individual rights."' However, cases where a separation of powers analysis does directly implicate individual rights provide
some insight into the separation of powers concerns underlying legislative singling out.
Two modern separation of powers cases directly implicating individual
rights have generated concurring opinions that relied on singling out rationales. Most recently, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc., Justice
Breyer concluded that the Constitution did not allow Congress to enact a

175. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468 (identifying elements of a valid bill of attainder claim).
The Bill of Attainder Clause has been interpreted to apply only when legislation specifically identifies the individual allegedly singled out. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
176. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) (discussing the libertyenhancing characteristic of separation of powers and noting Montesquieu's analysis of this
issue); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513 (1991) (analyzing the relationship between the concepts of separated powers and ordered liberty).
177. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (noting that the
Separation of Powers Clause is "essential to the preservation of liberty"); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1986) (same).
178. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 733-34.
179. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
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statute commanding reopening of a class of final judgments, due to the
statute's applicability to a closed and relatively small set of cases.' 80 A
decade earlier, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,8'
Justice Powell concluded that a legislative veto of an INS decision to suspend an alien's deportation constituted de facto adjudication, and thus
was beyond Congress' power. 182 Both of these opinions reflect the concern about a legislature being able to single out individuals for unfavorable treatment and thus, violate their rights to a neutral, unbiased application of law.
1. Justice Breyer's Singling Out Analysis
As noted earlier, in Plaut the Court struck down a statute requiring
federal courts to reopen final judgments in securities fraud cases where
the judgment was based on retroactive application of an intervening Su-8
actions. 1
preme Court opinion shortening the limitations period for such
In other words, Congress, unhappy with the fact that retroactive application of a new judicially-crafted limitations period would render untimely
suits that had previously been timely, ordered courts to apply the previous (longer) limitations period to suits that had been filed before the announcement of the new (shorter) period. The problem was that this legislative mandate extended to suits that had been dismissed based on the
intervening Supreme Court opinion, even if a dismissal had become final.
The Supreme Court struck down the statute on this ground, holding that
to the extent section 27A purported to require the reinstatement of lawsuits that had proceeded to final judgment, it intruded unconstitutionally
'84
into the judicial power to decide cases and controversies.
While the majority in Plaut focused on the integrity of final judgments
as a component of the judicial power, Justice Breyer applied a broader,
but less categorical, separation of powers test. For Justice Breyer, the
problem with section 27A was that it applied to a discrete, closed class of
180. See id. at 240-41 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
181. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
182. See id. at 965-66 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
183. See supra notes 92 & 97 and accompanying text. The new limitations period was
announced in Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364
(1991). Lampf itself did not decide the retroactive application of the new limitations period enunciated in that case. However, the same day the Court decided the limitations
period issue in Lampf, it also decided a case, James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,
holding that a new rule of federal law applied to the parties to the case announcing the
rule must also be applied to all cases pending on direct review. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991). Thus, under the Beam rule, the new limitations period in Lampf had to be applied to retroactively.
184. See Plaut,514 U.S. at 218-19.
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cases, indeed, a class of cases, the particulars of which Congress seemed
to be familiar. 185 These characteristics convinced him that there was simply too great a danger that Congress had singled out particular individuals for unfavorable treatment-the resurrection of lawsuits against
them. 86 In other words, by legislating so as to affect only a closed, limited, and apparently identified class of individuals, Congress applied law
to individuals, thereby acting like a court rather than making law.
Of course, as Justice Breyer himself pointed out, "sometimes Congress
can enact legislation that focuses upon a small group, or even a single individual." '87 For Justice Breyer, though, prospectivity and generality of
application (which he notes flows in part from the prospectivity itself'88)
make statutes "more than simply an effort to apply, person by person, a
previously enacted law, or to single out for oppressive treatment one, or
a handful, of particular individuals.' 8 9 Thus, he concludes:
if Congress enacted legislation that reopened an otherwise
closed judgment but in a way that mitigated some of the here
relevant "separation-of-powers" concerns, by also providing
some of the assurances against "singling out" that ordinary legislative activity normally provides - say, prospectivity and general applicability - we might have a different case.
Once he found that section 27A had "no such mitigating features,''.
the way was open for his conclusion that it violated the separation of
powers. 192
Justice Breyer's analysis reflects the close connection between legislative singling out, the separation of powers doctrine, and Klein's focus on
the law-changing/result-directing distinction. Breyer's analysis suggests
that singling out is analogous to applying, as opposed to changing, the
law. 193 This is a logical relationship, since adjudication can be thought of
as singling out individuals and applying the law to them on a case-by-case

185. See id. at 243-44 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting evidence suggesting Congress was aware of the particular lawsuits that would be resurrected under section 27A).
186. See id.
187. Id. at 242.
188. See id. at 242-43 (noting that the characteristic of prospectivity means that Congress is not completely able to predict the identity of the individuals who will be affected
by the law).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 243.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 246.
193. See id. at 242-43.
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basis. Legislation, on the other hand, can be thought of as the process of
prescribing generally applicable rules to an open-ended class) 94 Singling
out, then, can be thought of as another way of expressing the Klein concern about the appropriate realms of courts and legislatures.
Unfortunately, Justice Breyer's analysis fails to account for much Supreme Court jurisprudence. Indeed, it does not even explain why the
Court, in cases he cited, has upheld some laws in the face of singling out
challenges. For example, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,'95 the Court rejected a bill of attainder challenge to a statute that
aimed196 explicitly at the preservation of Richard Nixon's Presidential paThe statute may have been prospective (although that is not
pers.
clear) but the separation of powers benefit of prospectivity-that is,
leaves Congress not completely sure as to the scope of the statute's application and thus does not allow the legislature to single out particular
individuals for burdensome treatment-simply did not exist in that
case. 97 The statute dealt with President Nixon's papers, and only his, regardless of whether it did so prospectively or retroactively.? While citing such cases for the proposition that sometimes Congress may single
out, Justice Breyer fails to explain why the singling out in those cases' 99 is
appropriate, while it is not in others.
We are back, then, to the issue of classification. In cases cited by Justice Breyer the Court upheld legislation through which Congress placed
burdens on narrowly defined groups.9 The relevance of this issue to
Robertson is clear: if the trouble with Robertson is that Congress, in section 318, was trying effectively to decide particular cases, and if that concern has a well-established structural foundation, then what is the line
that separates invalid attempts to accomplish this singling out from valid
legislative classifications that simply happen to be extraordinarily narrow?

194. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (noting that the legislature creates general rules and the courts apply them to individuals).
195. 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (cited at Plaut, 514 U.S. at 242 (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
196. See id. at 483-84.
197. See id. at 429.
198. See id.
199. In addition to Nixon, Justice Breyer cites Selective Service System v. Minnesota
Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984), and United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437 (1965), both of which concern the Bill of Attainder Clause. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 242.
The Court rejected the bill of attainder claim in Selective Service but accepted it in Brown.
Compare Selective Service, 468 U.S. at 846, with Brown, 381 U.S. at 440.
200. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 242.
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2. The Problem of Legislative Specificity
The tension here is between, on the one hand, the above-described
model's concern that Congress not be allowed to single out individuals
for unfavorable treatment, and on the other hand, the Supreme Court's
realization, at least after 1937, that federal courts should generally defer
to legislative classification decisions. The clash is brought to a head by
statutes that single out, but do so for a plausible reason. If there is to be
any content to the singling out prohibition, then there must be judicial
review of Congress' rationale for singling out. Other rules may also be
used to enforce, at least partially, the singling out prohibition. For example, there could be a per se rule, as there is in bill of attainder doctrine, that statutes cannot identify the disfavored individual by name.20'
But because all legislation classifies," 2 at some point courts will have to
examine the appropriateness of legislative classifications, at least if they
are going to enforce the rule against singling out beyond the extreme
cases such as statutes that identify individuals by name.
This conclusion raises the issue of the Court's retreat, since 1937, from
stringent judicial review of legislatively-drawn classifications. It is, however, useful to examine the reasons for that development to determine if
they would in fact be offended by this type of judicial review in circumstances where the Court suspects singling out. In the immediate post1937 period, the Court justified its new reticence by embracing the view
that political checks furnish a superior method of ensuring appropriate
classifications, absent suspicion of a systemic defect in the political process producing those classifications. This view finds its best-known expression in Justice Stone's celebrated footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,203 although essentially the same point is made in
his less-famous contemporaneous footnote in South Carolina State
Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros. Inc.'°4 Today, it is reasonably set201. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316-18 (1946) (striking down as a
bill of attainder a statute depriving particular named individuals of their government salary).
202. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 342-45 (1949).
203. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
204. 303 U.S. 177,184-85 n.2 (1938). Justice Stone noted:
State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect is to
gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without, or to
burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those
within, have been thought to impinge upon the constitutional prohibition even
though Congress has not acted ....
Underlying the stated rule has been the
thought, often expressed in judicial opinion, that when the regulation is of such a
character that its burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative
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tied law that such classifications will be reviewed in the most deferential
manner possible, with courts straining to identify plausible reasons for
them, even if those reasons were not articulated by the legislature itself. °5 An exception arises only when the classification is based on inherently suspect characteristics, such as race, or restricts the exercise of a
fundamental right.0 6
Even here, though, there remains an opening that theoretically could
support heightened judicial scrutiny of at least some extremely specific
statutes. In attempting to explain a flurry of cases from the early 1980's
in which the Court applied what appeared to be a more stringent variety
of rationality review, one commentator has suggested that the Court was
reviewing the statutory ends/means relationship against a backdrop of
the burdened group's relative lack of access to the political process.2 0 7
This explanation essentially views the Court's review as applying stricter
review on a case-by-case basis, rather than on a wholesale basis, as is the
case when there is involved what the Court has identified as a suspect
class or a fundamental right. 08 The analysis is similar to that used to justify identifying a group as a suspect class; just as political powerlessness is
a criterion of suspect class status justifying stricter review of all statutes
burdening that class, so too, the Court will apply stricter scrutiny in
particular cases where the Court suspects the burdened group to have
been shut out of the political process.2 10
action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally
exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.
Id. (citations omitted).
205. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15, 17-18 (1992) (upholding state property tax assessment scheme resulting in differing property tax liabilities depending on
length of ownership). At times, however, the Court has examined legislative classifications more stringently, even while purporting to apply the same rationality review that
normally produces the extremely deferential review in cases such as Nordlinger. In the
early 1970's, for example, the Court's nascent concern for gender equality led some commentators to characterize the Court's rational basis jurisprudence as becoming more strict.
See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1972). Similar signals
in the early 1980's suggested to some commentators a reprise of that phenomenon. See,
e.g., Brenda Swierenga, Comment, Still Newer Equal Protection: Impermissible Purpose
Review in the 1984 Term, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1454, 1461-68 (1986) (discussing four cases
from the Court's 1984 term featuring this heightened rationality review).
206. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10.
207. See Swierenga, supra note 205, at 1478-81.
208. See id. at 1482 (describing the different Supreme Court analyses for suspect
classes and non-suspect classes).
209. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (identifying political powerlessness as a criterion).
210. See Swierenga, supra note 205, at 1481-83.
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It is at least arguable that this sort of political exclusion was present in
the process leading to section 318's enactment. As pointed out by the
Public Citizen amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court in Robertson,
the enactment process for many extremely specific statutes leaves much
to be desired. 11 With appropriations riders such as section 318, the provision is often not considered by the congressional committee with oversight for that particular subject-matter area. For example, committees
concerned with environmental matters did not hold hearings or otherwise consider section 318. Thus, watchdog groups that normally monitor
these committees could at least theoretically be taken by surprise when
an appropriations rider ends up affecting the substance with which such
groups are concerned. Other process problems are also present when the
subject-matter is a very precisely-drawn topic. For example, such legislation may not receive full consideration by Congress.212 In extreme cases,
the legislation may not even be printed for legislators to read before a
vote is taken.213
Thus, process flaws at least suggest the beginnings of a rationale for
judicial review of the substantive classifications drawn by legislatures. At
the constitutional level, this review can rely either on direct constitutional proscriptions against inappropriate classifications, such as those set
forth by the Equal Protection Clause, or else on an indirect proscription
against Congress functioning as the decision maker at a particular level
of specificity, as in the separation of powers doctrine.214 So far, section
318 is potentially troublesome on both counts. Clearly, there is concern
about the judicial nature of section 318's law-applying character. But
also, as noted above, there is at least the suggestion of an argument that
political exclusion may justify heightened review of the classification it-

211. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Public Citizen at 3, Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1991) (No. 90-1596).
212. Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that legislative processes inhospitable to full
congressional legislative deliberation should be subject to judicial limitation, mainly
through narrow readings of statutes produced by such processes. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 458, 487-88 (1989)
(proposing that courts give narrow construction to substantive provisions in appropriations statutes due to the problematic features of their enactment process, and calling generally for narrow construction of statutes enacted as a result of interest-group pressure).
213. This was the case, for example, with the legislative veto revoking the deportation
suspension of Jagdish Chadha, the subject of the case that struck down legislative vetoes.
See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 926-27 (1983) (noting
that the resolution vetoing suspension of Chadha's deportation was not printed before the
House of Representatives voted on it).
214. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 212, at 457-58 (arguing that non-constitutional doctrines
may be employed to limit the effect of such statutes).
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self.215 Justice Breyer's concurrence in Plaut recognizes the relationship
between these two doctrines but fails to provide criteria that determine
when Congress goes too far in singling out.216 Justice Powell's opinion in
217
Chadhamay provide us with more guidance.
3. JusticePowell's Chadha Analysis
Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Chadha218 is best known for
its holding striking down legislative vetoes 219 of all types220 as unconstitutional evasions of the lawmaking procedure set forth in the Constitution.
Justice Powell, however, concurred on a much narrower ground. He
agreed with the majority that the specific veto in that case, which overturned an INS decision suspending the deportation of an alien who had
overstayed his visa, was unconstitutional. However, he reached this conclusion on the ground that it constituted an adjudicatory act, and thus
violated the separation of powers doctrine.
After Justice Powell explained the concerns about legislative tyranny
that drove the framers to craft a system of separated powers, he analyzed
the one-House veto at issue in the particular case before the Court. As
he put it, "[o]n its face, the House's action appear[ed] clearly adjudicatory. '22 ' His analysis is set forth here:
The House did not enact a general rule; rather it made its own
determination that six specific persons did not comply with certain statutory criteria. It thus undertook the type of decision
that traditionally has been left to other branches. Even if the
House did not make a de novo determination, but simply reviewed the Immigration and Naturalization Service's findings, it
still assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to the federal
215. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
concur216. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 242 (1995) (Powell, J.,
ring in judgment).
217. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
218. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
219. Briefly, legislative vetoes are provisions that authorize the legislature to rescind,
or "veto," an agency's action by a method that falls short of that required for enactment of
a conventional statute. Thus, a provision allowing one legislative committee or one house
of Congress to rescind or prevent an agency's action would constitute a legislative veto.
220. See, e.g., Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am.,
463 U.S. 1216 (1983), aff'g 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that shortly after Chadha
was handed down, the Court relied on it to strike down legislative vetoes of agency rulemakings). Chadha itself dealt with a legislative veto of an agency adjudication, specifically, a determination that Mr. Chadha qualified for a discretionary waiver of deportability
status. However, the analysis in Chadha seemed clearly to apply to provisions for legislative vetoes of other types of agency actions as exemplified in Process Gas.
221. 462 U.S. at 964 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted).
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courts. Where, as here, Congress has exercised a power "that
cannot possibly be regarded as merely in aid of the legislative
function of Congress," the decisions of this Court have held that
Congress impermissibly assumed a function that the Constitution entrusted to another branch.222
Justice Powell then linked this legislative usurpation of judicial functions to the framers' concern about the exercise of unchecked and arbitrary power. He noted the lack of "internal constraints that prevent
[Congress] from arbitrarily depriving [Mr. Chadha] of the right to remain
in this country,, 223 the lack of "established substantive rules, '224 and, most
importantly for our purposes, the lack of "procedural safeguards, such as
the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal, that are
'' 22
present when a court or an agency adjudicates individual rights. 1 Justice Powell concluded by describing the model discussed earlier in this
Article: "The only effective constraint on Congress' power is political,
but Congress is most accountable politically when it prescribes rules of
general applicability. When it decides rights of specific persons, those
rights are subject to the tyranny of a shifting majority. '226 In Mr.
Chadha's case, the procedural concerns should have been quite salient:
he was under consideration for deportation, an act carrying with it the
most serious consequences for an individual's most important interests. 7
These consequences were clearly present in Chadha's own case, as an
ethnic Indian facing deportation to Idi Amin's Uganda. 221
In sum, what troubles Justice Powell about the veto of Chadha's deportation suspension is the lack of formal or political constraints on Congress' action. For our purposes, the important missing safeguards are
those that guarantee an individual's right to enjoy procedural protections
before the government can impose such a significant deprivation on him.
The fact that this analysis is relevant to a separation of powers question
suggests the linkage between the separation of powers and due process

222. Id. at 964-66 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (footnote and citations omitted).
223. Id. at 966 (footnote omitted).
224. Id.
225. Id. (footnote omitted).
226. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
227. Cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (stating that deportation may
result "in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.").
228.

See generally BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG,

CHADHA:

THE STORY OF AN EPic

CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE (1988) (considering the particular facts surrounding Jagdish
Chadha's personal situation).
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229

doctrines.
Justice Powell's opinion suggests this linkage, not only by
raising the issue of procedural safeguards in a separation of powers context, 30° but also by noting his lack of concern with legislative singling out
that benefits the target.31 Thus, singling out seems to be a problem not as
a general matter, but only when the target suffers what in the due process
context would be called a deprivation of a due process interest. Justice
Powell's analysis suggests that concerns underlying due process may be
of use in examining possible separation of powers problems with section
318.
C. Due Process and Section 318
Due process per se does not apply to the analysis of statutes such as
section 318. The doctrine indicates that section 318 did not impair interests possessed by individuals such as members of the Seattle Audubon
Society 232 with sufficient directness so as to constitute a denial of a due
233
process-protected interest.
For example, in O'Bannon v. Town Court
Nursing Center,2 the Court held that federally-funded nursing home patients did not suffer a deprivation of a due process-protected interest
when government action threatened to decertify the nursing home in

229. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 178, at 1535 (stating that "what Montesquieu described as a structural problem translates easily into the concept of due process"); Cf
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§

10-7, at 664 n.4 (2d ed.

1988); id. § 17.1, at 1673-87 (discussing the structure of decision making process as related
to due process concerns).
230. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
231. See id., at 966 n.9 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment); see also TRIBE, supra note
229, § 10-6, at 663 n.38 (noting that private bills conferring a benefit are not considered
problematic as a separation of powers matter).
232. Identification of the conservation group plaintiffs as the affected parties implicitly
puts aside the question whether the spotted owl or the old-growth forests should be conceived of as having due process interests of their own. Such a proposition is analogous to
the suggestion that such inanimate objects should be considered to have standing to sue
when governmental action threatens their impairment or destruction. See Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also William D. Araiza,
Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based ConstitutionalTheory, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L.
REv. 385 (1997) (considering criticism that the public trust doctrine is too vague and that
efficiency in resource allocation decision making will be threatened by the doctrine);
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 (1972) (proposing that we give legal rights to "natural
objects" in the environment).
233. It is possible, though, that a statute that simply directed the dismissal of named
lawsuits would violate the due process rights of the plaintiffs in those suits to a fair trial on
their claims. However, section 318 did not purport to do that.
234. 447 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1980).
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which they lived, even though decertification would require the patients
to move to another nursing home. The Court reasoned that any harm to
the patients arising out of the government's decertification action would
be an indirect result of that action, and thus not a deprivation of any constitutionally-protected interest. 235 Just like the patients in O'Bannon,
plaintiffs in Robertson may have been injured by the government action
of enacting section 318. Indeed, if the government's conduct had not injured them sufficiently, then, presumably, they would not have had
standing to sue. Yet the injury was not sufficiently direct so as to allow
them to claim a deprivation of a due process right.236
Even though due process itself does not apply directly, the concerns
underlying due process may suggest ways in which a right to be heard
may apply to the legislative process. While such a right to political participation itself might not rest on the foundation of due process per se, it
plays an important supporting role in the foundational cases establishing
the scope of the due process guarantee. In the foundational cases of
Londoner
v. Denver237 and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
E ..
.238
Equalization the Court distinguished, for due process purposes, between statutes that burden an entire class of persons and those that burden individuals based on their particularized characteristics. 2 ' Accord235. See id. at 787. The O'Bannon Court concluded that:
[t]he simple distinction between government action that directly affects a citizen's legal rights, or imposes a direct restraint on his liberty, and action that is directed against a third party and affects the citizen only indirectly or incidentally,
provides a sufficient answer to all of the cases on which the patients rely in this
Court.
Id. at 788; see also id. at 789 ("Over a century ago this Court recognized the principle that
the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to the indirect adverse
effects of governmental action.").
236. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975), to clarify the relationship
between the constitutional requirement that the injury be sufficiently direct, in the sense
that the defendant causes it, with the O'Bannon requirement that the government action
"directly affect[ ] a citizen's legal rights, or impose[ ] a direct restraint on his liberty,"
447 U.S. at 788. The standing requirement explicitly leaves open the possibility that allegedly illegal action against one party might sufficiently harm a third party so as to satisfy
the constitutional standing requirement. See, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 500-501 (third-party
standing bar is not a constitutional requirement but can be overcome by judicial or legislatively-enacted exemptions). On the other hand, O'Bannon indicates that such a thirdparty injury scenario is insufficient to sustain an allegation that a due process interest has
been violated. See O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 787-89.
237. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
238. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
239. See Londoner, 210 U.S. at 380 (noting that the plaintiffs challenged a city's refusal
to grant a hearing to challenge a special tax assessment based on an individualized determination of each property owner's benefit from a municipal improvement); Bi-Metallic,
239 U.S. at 444 (considering the plaintiffs' argument that the absence of a hearing at which

1999] The Line Between Statutory Amendment & Statutory Interpretation 1103

ingly, individuals burdened in their capacity as members of a class must
defend their interests in the legislature. Individuals burdened in their
capacity as individuals, or on the basis of facts unique to them, cannot be
expected to participate effectively in the legislative process, and thus
must be allowed a chance to make their case in individualized hearings.
In Bi-Metallic, Justice Holmes made this distinction clear in the course of
distinguishing the earlier Londoner case:
Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is
impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in its
adoption. .

. Their rights are protected in the only way that

they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or
remote, over those who make the rule. .

. [In Londoner v.

Denver a] relatively small number of persons was concerned,
who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual
grounds, and it was held that they had a right to a hearing. But
that decision is far from reaching a general determination
dealing only with the principle upon which all the [tax] assessments in a county had been laid. 4
Commentators have identified several rationales for the distinction
Justice Holmes drew between Londoner and Bi-Metallic.2 4' The above
quotation from Bi-Metallic indicates clearly that Justice Holmes relied, at
least tect
inheir
part, "on the
.242plaintiffs' ability to use the political process to protect their interests.
But if those rights can be protected only by recourse to the political process, then judicial scrutiny of the legislative
process may be appropriate as a means of ensuring that the only process
available to such persons is in fact a fair one. In other words, if the only
"process" that such persons are due is the political process, then judicial
scrutiny of that process may be the appropriate quid pro quo to the denial of an individualized hearing. 243 This theory seems to have played
they could contest an across-the-board upward revaluation of all taxable real property in
the city violated their due process rights).
240. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445-46.
241. See, e.g., 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 156, § 9.2, at 6-8 (noting several of these
rationales, including 1) concerns over delay and expense that would be entailed in providing hearing rights for individuals affected as members of a large class; 2) the decreased
likelihood that individuals would have special access to the legislative facts normally at
issue in policy questions, as opposed to the adjudicative facts normally at issue in questions dealing with the application of law to particular individuals; and 3) the political process rationale that individuals affected as members of classes by legislatures have a better
chance to protect their interests in the legislative process than do individuals singled out
for government coercion).
242. See id. § 9.2, at 4 (noting this rationale).
243. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1582
(1988) (arguing that courts in a republican polity should "use [statutory] interpretation to
guard against or limit [possible malfunctions in the legislative process]").
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some role in the majority's analysis in Chadha, which is perhaps the most
obvious example of judicial policing of the legislative process. In the
course of striking down the legislative veto, the Court noted the troublingly cursory nature of the consideration the House gave to the particular veto challenged in that case,'" and described the bicameralism
and presentment requirements, at least partially, as tools to ensure care245
Moreover, the Court's exful consideration of proposed legislation.
planation of why quasi-legislative action by agencies did not have to satisfy the bicameralism requirement relied in part on the controls that
already existed on agency action-controls that include statutory246 and
acts. 248
constitutional 247 restrictions on the process by which the agency
Process, then, may be relevant even when due process per se is not.
D. Summary
The problems with a Klein-based analysis of section 318 have led us to
consider the branch of separation of powers analysis concerned with legislative singling out. Justice Breyer's analysis in Plaut suggests the close
connection between singling out and Klein's concern about legislative direction of judicial results, but leaves us with an unsatisfactory explanation of singling out specifically, why some instances of singling out pass
constitutional muster. In Chadha, Justice Powell confronted a situation
where a singled-out individual was faced with loss of a classic due process
244. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 926-28 (1983).
245. See id. at 946-51.
246. See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
247. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also, e.g., Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (noting the existence of due process-based requirements
for Article III review of agency adjudicatory decisions); Bell Lines, Inc. v. United States,
263 F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.W. Va. 1967) (holding that "the requirements of the [APA] are
fundamental to due process" and that administrative decisions shall include public participation); M. Elizabeth Magill, CongressionalControl Over Agency Rulemaking: The Nutrition Labeling and EducationAct's Hammer Provisions,50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149, 174-75
(1995) (noting possible due process foundation for requirement that individuals be able to
participate in at least a notice and comment rulemaking process); Richard J. Wolf, Note,
Judicial Review of Retroactive Rulemaking: Has Georgetown Neglected the Plastic Remedies?, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 157, 161 n.20 (1990) ("Informal agency action under the APA
passes procedural due process muster because its procedural framework provides interested parties with an opportunity to be heard in the notice and comment process of informal rulemaking and a rudimentary opportunity to be heard in case-by-case adjudication.").
248. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953-54 n.16; see also id. at 966 n.10 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting the existence of these controls as an explanation why agency action did not
have to satisfy the bicameralism requirement); TRIBE, supra note 229, § 10-6, at 658 &
n.10 (discussing Justice Powell's footnote 10 from Chadha).
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interest. Thus, he was able to focus on the sorts of procedural protections the target should enjoy, but could not exercise in the legislative
process-most fundamentally, the right to be heard. Justice Powell's
analysis suggests that, because due process would require these sorts of
procedural protections, and because the legislative process cannot accommodate those protections, the decision is thus one that cannot be
made by the legislature.249 Justice Powell's focus on the procedural protections that the targeted individual should enjoy, and the separation of
powers problem that arises when the decision-making entity is incapable
of offering that sort of procedure, suggests a line of inquiry into the type
of procedure any singled-out individual should be able to enjoy, regardless of whether he is being deprived of a cognizable due process interest.
This concern also ties in nicely with the foundational due process cases of
Londoner and Bi-Metallic: if, as Justice Holmes says, an individual affected as a member of a class must find his salvation not in the courts but
in the legislature, then should there not be some guarantee of a reasonably fair and accessible legislative process?25 °
Applying this analysis to section 318 indicates that any judicial review
should focus on the process by which it was enacted, and not on the substantive appropriateness of its environment-economy trade-offs or the
special status accorded the Northwest forests. This conclusion flows
from a proper respect for relative institutional competencies of courts
and legislatures; after all, what do courts know about the specific characteristics of the Northwest's ecosystem and economic needs? Thus, we
are faced with a situation where the legislature should be able to do the
classifying, and the resulting classification may appropriately be quite

249. This would also go some way toward understanding why the Court has limited its
bill of attainder analysis to instances of legislative imposition of punitive measures against
named individuals. Because due process requires that such measures be imposed only after a process that is incompatible with normal legislative processes, it stands to reason that
Congress would be disabled from imposing such measures. Consistent with this analysis is
the Constitution's prescription of the impeachment process, the only instance in which
Congress is authorized to pass judgment on individuals. Tellingly, the Constitution's impeachment process (1) provides for the separation of the charging and judging functions,
see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 ("The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment"); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try
all Impeachments"); (2) describes the Senate's procedure at such a trial, see id.; and (3)
installs the Chief Justice of the United States as the presiding officer at any Presidential
impeachment trial, see id.
250. But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625-26 (1996) (affirming a state court's
judgment striking down a state constitutional provision prohibiting local or state laws protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination, but declining to consider the state court's
rationale that the provision violated gays' and lesbians' asserted fundamental right to participate in the political process).
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narrow, depending on the legislature's understanding of the particular
characteristics of the affected forests and economies. However, because
the resulting classifications may be narrow, it is possible that the process
producing that classification may have been infected by illegitimate singling out. Courts may most effectively guard against such a result by policing not the substance of the legislation, but instead, the process by
which it is enacted. Not only does this role best correspond to the courts'
limited competence, but doctrinally this role fits quite snugly within the
Londoner/Bi-Metallic analysis noted above-specifically, the importance
of a fair legislative process when the legislature is all that an individual
can rely on.
How should courts go about reviewing the fairness of the legislative
process? In answering this question it is helpful to turn to a concept
known as "due process of lawmaking."
IV. DUE PROCESS OF LAWMAKING

A. Introduction
The term "due process of lawmaking," coined by Justice Hans Linde of
the Oregon Supreme Court, 25' has been used in a wide variety of contexts. Linking these contexts, however, is the idea that judicial review of
legislation should not purport to second-guess its substantive content, but
instead should scrutinize either the process by which a governmental decision was made, or the structure of the decision-making entity. Proponents of this sort of review, including Justice Linde himself, consider it to
be more appropriate than judicial review of the substance of government
action, which is criticized as beyond judicial competence and overly intrusive into the legislature's policy-making prerogative .252 Scholars have
identified a variety of governmental actions claimed to be amenable to
this type of judicial review, among them a statute discriminating on the
basis of gender, whose benign justification was apparently not the actual
purpose motivating its enactment,253 a statute whose burdening of a class
251. See Hans A. Linde, Due Processof Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197,255 (1976).
252. See, e.g., id. at 243; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof
Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REV. 873, 915 (1987); see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1,
66-67 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (arguing against stringent judicial review of the substantive accuracy of EPA technical judgments, given courts' lack of
understanding of scientific issues, and arguing instead that courts play their most constructive roles by ensuring the fairness of the procedure by which EPA came to its conclusions).
253. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 n.16 (1982); Cass R.
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 56-58 & n.122
(1985) (using the Supreme Court's gender discrimination jurisprudence as an example of
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may have resulted from congressional inadvertence or mistake,154 or an
administrative regulation that may have been supported by a policy rationale over which the agency was not granted any responsibility."' In all
of these situations, the perceived flaw in the governmental action lay not
in its substance, but instead in the means by which the government acted.
Thus, in the first example the legislature might have successfully justified
its statute had it shown that it had really been motivated by the benign
rationale; in the second, the legislature might have justified its action had
it shown that it actually understood what it was doing, and, in the third,
the same rule might have been valid had it issued from a body with responsibility for implementing the policy that was cited as the rationale
for the decision.
This theory is subject to a number of critiques. To the extent it relies
on discovery of a purported legislative intent, it is open to the wellknown criticism that such intent either does not exist, cannot be known,
or at least does not furnish a legitimate basis for judicial decision.256
More generally, a judicial focus on the legislative process could be seen
as an illegitimate incursion into the internal affairs of a coordinate
branch of government, 257 save for the few situations where the suspect
judicial focus on the extent to which a challenged statute was the product of reasoned
analysis); see also TRIBE, supra note 207, § 17-2, at 1682 (discussing Hogan).
254. See Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 96-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Farber & Frickey, supra note 252, at 917 n.247 (noting Justice Stevens' dissent as
an example of judicial opinions focusing on the extent of the legislature's deliberation); cf
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 182-83, 185-86 (1980) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Equal Protection Clause was violated when a statute burdened one group of railroad workers relative to another, based on suspected congressional
misunderstanding of the bill's likely effects).
255. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88,116-17 (1976) (striking down a Civil
Service Commission regulation that cited a foreign policy rationale, on the ground that the
Commission was not entrusted with implementation of foreign policy); TRIBE, supra note
207, § 17-2, at 1678-79 (discussing Hampton in the context of Professor Tribe's theory of
"structural justice").
256. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 702-05 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's attempt to discern the "true" motivation of a legislative body). The best-known judicial proponent of this view is Justice Antonin Scalia. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing intent-based interpretive methodology and arguing that statute and its later amendments must be interpreted based on the
resulting text and not by analyzing the intent of the original enacting and amending Congresses), overruled on other grounds, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Public
choice theorists have also noted the difficulties inherent in accurately determining the intent of a legislative body whose operations raise sequential voting and agenda control concerns. For an explanation and evaluation of this argument, see generally Daniel A. Farber
& Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988).
257. But see Linde, supra note 251, at 243 (discounting importance of this objection).
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process violates a clear constitutional mandate, such as the bicameralism
and presentment requirements for legislation15 or the principle-rarely,
if ever, enforced today-that Congress may not delegate its legislative
power.2 59 Extreme applications of this theory might also elicit the objection that the procedural requirements constitute a useless formalism.
On the other hand, judicial focus on the process or structure of lawmaking has advantages. Commentators and judges have suggested that
courts are simply more competent to review such issues than to assess the
substance of the resulting legislation.2 6 This sort of review is at least arguably less intrusive on a coordinate branch than a second-guessing of
the substance of their decisions, especially when the review makes it
clear that the government remains at least potentially able to achieve the
same result.2 6' Such review may also be more honest, with corresponding
credibility benefits for courts, to the extent it avoids substantive review
that is essentially a rubber stamp262 (except for the rare case where more
searching review only serves to confuse lower courts and private parties) 263 . Finally, the theoretical basis for this approach fits neatly into the
258. See Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)
(striking down legislative veto as violative of the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment requirements). But see, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Judicial Review and the
Power of the Purse, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 191, 193-98 (1992) (proposing that courts
prohibit Congress from waiving its own internal rules restricting use of appropriations bills
to amend substantive legislation).
259.

See, e.g., I KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE § 2.6 (3d. ed. 1994) (suggesting demise of the non-delegation doctrine).
But see City of New York v. Clinton, 985 F. Supp. 168, 182 (D.D.C. 1998) (striking down
the Line Item Veto Act based on a version of the non-delegation doctrine), aff'd on different grounds, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
260. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 252, at 915 (stating that the courts are
more capable of ensuring a system of deliberative due process than deciding specifically
whether a statute embraces public values); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-67 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (discussing the need for a sound administrative process because of the lack of expertise judges have with highly mathematical and
scientific analysis).
261. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 251, at 243.
262. Cf United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 186-87 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's equal protection review of economic
and social regulation as tautological).
263. Compare, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (upholding purchase
price real estate tax valuation scheme as satisfying equal protection's rational basis test),
with Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336,
344-46 (1989) (striking down essentially the same scheme using the same rational basis
standard). See generally Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 18 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that Nordlinger and Allegheny Pittsburgh are inconsistent since the taxation schemes involved were indistinguishable); id. at 31-32 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (concluding there is little difference whether the discrimination was de jure
as in Nordlingeror de facto as in Allegheny Pittsburgh).
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Due Process Clause's fundamental distinction between the constitutional
protections afforded persons burdened as a class and persons burdened
as individuals, by ensuring that due process means something even for
individuals relegated to the political process.264
Applying this insight to section 318 raises several questions. Was the
process leading to section 318's enactment appropriate? If not, what values were offended? Can a court protect those values?
B. Due Processof Lawmaking and Section 318
Section 318 emerged from a less-than-ideal legislative process. As a
substantive provision included in an appropriations bill,2 65 section 318 was
not subject to the scrutiny of the congressional committees with jurisdiction over the National forests, nor did it ever face an up or down vote on
its own merits before the full House or Senate.' 66 Commentators have
261
including not only the
pointed out the shortcomings of such a••process,
268
reduced quality of the resulting legislation, but also undesirable proce-

264. See generally Swierenga, supra note 205. Indeed, Swierenga has analyzed several
Supreme Court decisions striking down laws as violating equal protection's rational basis
standard as looking fundamentally to whether the burdened individuals had been afforded
fair access to the political process. That analysis not only echoes the Carolene Products
understanding of equal protection, but it also suggests the role due process could play in
situations where due process does not require an individualized determination before government burdens an individual.
265. Provisions such as section 318 should be distinguished from appropriations riders
that deal specifically with the spending of federal money. An example of the latter includes provisions that prohibit the agency in question from spending money on a particular program, or to enforce a particular regulation. Courts have disagreed on whether such
provisions constitute substantive changes in the underlying law, beyond a mere funding
limitation. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation
Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 481-99 (recounting disagreements among courts on this issue).
By contrast, provisions such as section 318 purport clearly to do more than affect how
agencies can spend money. The only question addressed by this Article is whether there is
some constitutional objection to imposing this sort of substantive change by means of a
precisely-directed provision contained in an appropriations bill.
266. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 57, at 478 (noting that neither the Agriculture,
Environment, nor the Judiciary Committees of Congress examined section 318).
267. For a general critique of the use of appropriations riders to amend substantive
legislation, see Sandra B. Zellmer, Sacrificing Legislative Integrity at the Alter of Appropriations Riders: A ConstitutionalCrisis, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (1997) and Devins, supra note 265, which discusses particular problems posed by limitations riders to appropriations bills.
268. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, CongressionalCommentary on JudicialInterpretation
of Statutes: Idle Chatteror Telling Response, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 58 (1994) ("To the extent
Congress legislates more furtively, without such input from interested and technically
competent outsiders, it often produces a shoddier product").
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69
dural features such as its impairment of both legislative deliberation
and public access to the legislative process, 270 and the attendant rise in the
influence of narrow interest groups and decline in the legislature's ultimate accountability to the electorate.272 Moreover, as a piece of extremely particularistic legislation, section 318 reflects a style of legislative
conduct that has been criticized as inappropriate for a majoritarian
body.273 Section 318's particularistic focus raises a risk of singling out, by
eliminating the possibility that a piece of legislation will apply to other,

269. See, e.g., Susan Low Bloch, Orphaned Rules in the Administrative State: The Fairness Doctrine and Other Orphaned Progeny of Interactive Deregulation,76 GEo. L.J. 59,
112 (1987) (arguing that "appropriation riders are frequently not the product of legislative
deliberation and consensus"); Devins, supra note 265, at 465 (finding that "substantive
policymaking by limitation riders does not allow for sufficient study of the policy issues in
question"); Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, OSHA's Critics and Regulatory
Reform, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 643-45 (1996) (noting lack of debate on the important issue of restricting OSHA's ability to promulgate workplace standards when the
restriction was placed in an appropriations bill); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the
Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigmand its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 805, 814 n.32 (1986) (documenting a case of Congress enacting a substantive
provision of which it was unaware, due to its inclusion in an appropriations rider); Zellmer, supra note 267, at 484-85 (noting legislators' complaints that a particular appropriations rider had been misrepresented to them).
270.

See, e.g., ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY

INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 91 (1997) (noting the importance of
committee hearings in focusing public attention on proposed legislation and allowing interested parties to be heard); Brudney, supra note 268, at 58 ("Whatever its shortcomings,
the current, committee-centered legislative drafting process is a relatively 'public' experience. There is considerable opportunity for notice to affected government and private
groups and for participation by those groups."); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 269, at
644.
The thousands of workers who will not receive the protections from an effective
OSHA ergonomics standard were not likely to have learned of the congressional
attempt to kill the standard through the appropriations process in time to write
their representatives. Even if their opinions had been expressed, it would have
been easy for a representative to claim that his or her hands were tied by the
need to enact an appropriations bill to keep the government running.
Id.; Zellmer, supra note 267, at 500-503 (noting public access accorded by normal committee-based drafting process).
271. See, e.g., McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 269, at 643; Sunstein, supra note 243, at
1582-83.
. 272. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 270, at 91 (noting the importance of committee
hearings to "establish a forum at which legislators can be evaluated"). For general process
critiques of the use of appropriations riders, see Sher & Hunting, supra note 57, at 476-85,
and Linda M. Bolduan, Comment, The Hatfield Riders: Eliminatingthe Role of the Courts
in EnvironmentalDecision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 329, 375-80 (1990).
273. See supra Part III.B (describing Justice Breyer's critique of the statute struck
down in Plaut, and Justice Powell's critique of the statute struck down in Chadha). But see
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995) (criticizing the idea that a statute's
ultra-particularity calls into question its status as a legislative act).
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currently unknowable, transactions or individuals in the future. This
possibility is one of the major guarantees against oppressive laws, and
274
encourages careful legislative scrutiny of proposed legislation.
In section 318's case, the ill-effects of this particularism were heightened by its
format as a direction to courts to find pre-existing statutory requirements
satisfied, as opposed to an explicit repeal of those requirements, or even
an acknowledgment of those requirements by means of a "notwithstanding any other provision of law" clause. 275 The impact on legislative
deliberation of section 318's format derives from the possibility of legislative "hiding" inherent in the failure to explicitly repeal or create an exemption from pre-existing legislation that section 318 clearly impacts.
Nevertheless, this diagnosis is open to criticism. First, it is not clear
that the process producing section 318 restricts public participation in the
actual legislative process to any greater degree than the "normal" legislative process. It is theoretically possible that section 318's insertion into
an appropriations bill, rather than a bill handled by the committees that
usually deal with logging issues, might have caught some interested
groups off guard.276 But this is by no means clear. Section 318 represented a major part of the resolution of the spotted owl issue. Thus, interest groups on both sides clearly should have been aware of its pendency in the appropriations bill for the Interior Department. The direct
277
evidence that does exist suggests as much, as does the compromise
character of the final result. At the very least, the public controversy
surrounding the successor provision to section 318 suggests that the en274. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (citing cases discussing the protection
general laws afford against arbitrary government action).
275. See Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783-349, § 114(a) (1986), reenacted in identical
form as Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341-349, § 114(a) (1986).
276. Cf. Sher & Hunting, supra note 57, at 487 n.265 (1991) (suggesting the possibility
that Congress could bypass the traditional enactment process even in the face of "the most
vigilant outside participants"). But see infra note 279 (asserting that not all appropriations
bills are hidden).
277. See, e.g., Stuart Wasserman, Oregon's Version of the Spotted Owl Battle Accelerates, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., July 17,1990, at A8 (discussing section 318's logging provi-

sions and quoting James Monteith, director of Oregon's Natural Resources Council, as
stating "the politics are all over the place"). This suspicion is also borne out by the experience of other battles in the war over the Spotted Owl, where substantive appropriations
riders dealing with. management of the Northwest forests were the target of significant
controversy. See, e.g., Greg Brown et al., Allowable Sale Quantity (ASQ) of Timber as a
Focal Point in National Forest Management, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 569, 584-86 (1993)
(recounting political controversy over an appropriations rider setting forth government
timbering policy in the Northwest forests); see also Sher & Hunting, supra note 57, at 48790 (describing the controversy over the successor provision to section 318, and how it was
eventually voted down in the Senate after environmental groups made its defeat a high
priority).
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actment of the original provision caused environmental groups to pay
close attention to the appropriations process. Indeed, the successor provision to section 318-again inserted into the Interior Department's annual appropriations bill-caused a great deal of controversy, and its defeat was considered a high priority by environmental groups.278
Representatives voting on this latter bill certainly knew its contents, at
least as much as they know about the contents of any other piece of legislation.
More generally, it seems doubtful that substantive appropriations riders always, or even usually, fail to attract the attention necessary to ensure spirited debate, public lobbying (at least by organized interest
groups) and legislative deliberation.279 Certainly, for example, it would
not be accurate to so describe the riders attached to Defense Department
authorization bills in the early 1970's that prohibited further funding for
the Vietnam War, or the riders dealing with federal policy toward racially discriminatory private schools.280 Indeed, riders are sometimes appended to appropriations bills exactly because the substance of the rider
is sufficiently controversial as to imperil its passage as a freestanding bill,
but may be more successful if its fate is tied to that of a necessary appropriations measure.
The point here is that the inability to draw general conclusions about
the process implications of appropriations riders makes it difficult to
craft an appropriate judicial response. For the Court, the choice would
be between imposing a categorical rule against substantive appropriations riders, regardless of the level of deliberation that attended any individual rider, and reviewing the legislative process producing the particular challenged rider, in order to determine how much Congress was
thinking about that issue. With the possible exception of probably-rare
cases where there is evidence of affirmative misunderstanding by Congress, 282 this is a troubling choice. While a categorical rule would impose
278. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 57, at 487-90 (stating that environmental groups
"made it one of the key environmental votes of the year").
279. It is at least probably true that not all appropriations bills are so hidden. See, e.g.,
Kathryn Abrams, Comment, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1602 (1988) (criticizing the generality of the argument that appropriations provisions should be construed
narrowly).
280. See Neal Devins, Budget Reform and the Balance of Powers, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 993, 1009-10 (1990).
281. Cf. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 258 (proposing a judicially-crafted prohibition on
Congress waiving its internal rule against including substantive legislation in appropriations bills).
282. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 193 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress, when considering complex amendments

1999]The Line Between Statutory Amendment & Statutory Interpretation 1113

legislative restrictions not found in the Constitution,"' a rule requiring
rider-by-rider inquiry into the amount of congressional deliberation
would require a severe judicial intrusion into the conduct of legislative
business, unanchored by a specific constitutional prescription of legisla285286
284
tive procedures8 or limitation on the powers"" enjoyed by Congress.
In reality, affirmative misunderstanding would probably be much rarer
than legislative inattention to a single rider attached to an enormous
(and possibly unrelated) appropriations bill.8 Legislative inattention,
even though it reflects presumably undesirable legislative conduct, nevertheless presents its own unique challenge for a court: if Congress gives
a particular amount of attention to the overall spending issues implicated
by an appropriations bill, how would a court determine what percentage
to a railroad worker retirement scheme, was misled by interest groups that played an unusually large role in drafting and defending the legislation). This is described only as a
possible exception since, at least, the Fritz Court is unwilling to give effect to evidence of
Congress' alleged misunderstanding. See id. at 179.
[W]e disagree with the District Court's conclusion that Congress was unaware of
what it accomplished [in the statute] or that it was misled by the groups that appeared before it. If this test were applied literally to every member of any legislature that ever voted on a law, there would be very few laws which would survive it. The language of the statute is clear, and we have historically assumed
that Congress intended what it enacted.
Id. Moreover, limitation of such review to the rider process is both under-inclusive and
over-inclusive. As suggested above, see supra text accompanying notes 279-280, some riders are quite controversial, while some non-rider legislation may suffer from lack of congressional attention or understanding, as Justice Brennan argued occurred with the legislation challenged in Fritz.
283. Cf Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)
(striking down the legislative veto as a violation of the constitutionally-mandated procedures for enacting legislation). In fact, one commentator has proposed amending the
Constitution so as to enact this very format restriction. See Zellmer, supra note 267, at
512-35.
284. See Zellmer, supranote 267, at 512-35.
285. Cf Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-548 (1969) (rejecting argument that
House of Representatives' decision not to seat a duly-elected representative was a political
question because it was allegedly a decision textually committed to Congress, given Congress' power to judge the qualifications of its members and to expel members).
286. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that
this sort of deliberateness review would be inconsistent with the rationality review the
Court would otherwise apply to the substance of such legislation). Justice Souter criticized
the majority's suggestion that legislative findings on the effect on interstate commerce of
possession of guns in school zones would assist the Court in upholding the statute as an
exercise of Congress' commerce power, because this would constitute deliberateness review, which would be "as patently unconstitutional as an Act of Congress mandating long
opinions from this Court." Id.
287. See, e.g., McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 271, at 643-44 (describing the process
by which an important substantive rider was attached to a much larger budget bill and thus
received little consideration during the floor debate).
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of that attention-however attention is measured-sufficed to constitute
adequate attention? Even Professor Sunstein, while urging such review
for deliberativeness, acknowledges the institutional competence problem
here 288
.
The same empirical doubts attend any claim that section 318's format
makes it impossible for members of the broader public to hold legislators
accountable for their votes. Courts and commentators have embraced
analogous accountability claims as the basis for the non-delegation and
"state government commandeering" doctrines. The doctrine against
delegating legislative power to administrative agencies rests in part on
the concern that political accountability is diminished when elected legislators do not make fundamental policy choices, but instead delegate
those responsibilities to non-elected administrators. Such broad delegation of policy formation allows legislators to "hide," by noting, that a
specific government action was not of their doing. Such hiding, in turn,
damages the concept of representative democracy."' In recent years, the
Supreme Court has embraced an analogous concern as a basis for invalidating federal laws commanding state governments to implement federal
mandates. According to the Court, such mandates make it difficult for
voters to know which level of government to hold responsible for policy
successes or failures, and thus again undermine the principles of representative democracy.9 0
Even if there is validity to the accountability concerns addressed in
these doctrines, a point on which there is strong disagreement, 2911that fact
288. See Sunstein, supra note 253, at 77 (discussing the mixed motives that legislators
possess and the problems a court would have in deciphering those motives).
289. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 132-34 (1980).
290. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2382 (1997) (discussing why the federal government cannot require states to implement a federal gun control law); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992) (stating that the states are not political subdivisions of the Federal Governmment). Professors Davis and Pierce also suggest an accountability-based argument against the "bitter with the sweet" theory of procedural due
process, under which government has the power not just to create a property interest in a
government benefit but also to prescribe the procedure the beneficiary is due if the government attempts to deprive an individual of the benefit. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 151-54 (1974) (plurality opinion) (adopting this theory). But see Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (rejecting this theory, on behalf of a majority
of the Court). This theory, according to Davis and Pierce, impairs the legislature's accountability to the public, by empowering the legislature to create benefits while allowing
agencies to deprive those benefits selectively. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 166,
§ 9.4, at 35-36.
291. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 87-88 (1985) (presenting and then critiquing accountability-based theories for favoring stricter non-delegation doctrine). Compare Printz, 117 S. Ct.
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does not necessarily suggest that the rider process should elicit the same
concern. At least in the commandeering and non-delegation cases, it
could be said that the voter looking for someone to blame incorrectly
passes over Congress, because the actual mandates affecting individuals
issue either from the commandeered state or the agency implementing a
standardless congressional mandate. 29' Here, by contrast, Congress has
made its intention at least as plain as it has in other complicated, intricately-worded statutory schemes. It may take some effort for a voter to
discern the true meaning of section 318-that compliance with its provisions excuses the need to comply with pre-existing environmental statutes-but the voter's deciphering task is surely no more complicated
than determining Congress' policy choices in, for example, ERISA293 or
the Clean Air Act.29 4 In sum, if the appropriations rider process does not
make it any more difficult than normal for the public to know about and
at 2395 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that local law enforcement officials are able
to publicize the federal nature of the Brady Law's background check mandate, and thus to
direct public criticism of the policy to the appropriate level of government) and Evan H.
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers
to Implement FederalLaw?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1060-87 (1995) (critiquing the Supreme Court's anti-commandeering jurisprudence as based on an empirically unsound
concern for accountability), with Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2382 (majority opinion) (arguing that
political accountability is deflected from Congress to states when Congress requires state
law enforcement officers to devote time and effort to enforcing federal laws) and Edward
A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public
Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1406-09 (1993) (ar-

guing that unfunded federal mandates are best understood as legislative attempts by Congress to deflect political accountability to lower levels of government). One commentator
reasons that "legislators have an incentive to pass [substantive laws for which appropriations are never made] because they can claim credit at the time of passage and may never
be blamed for the low level of appropriations." Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law
and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 349-54
(1988)(arguing that voters generally have little information about legislatures' actions, and
concluding that courts should interpret statutes in a manner that will inform that public
about legislative bargains). But see Caminker, supra at 1068-69 (noting that voters have
access to information that reveal the federal nature of the mandate for state action, and
concluding that voter failure to do the appropriate investigation, though lamentable, is no
less unconstitutional than voter apathy).
292. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168-69 (stating that a congressional mandate for state
action means that the state government officials may be blamed for the policy notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate policy decision was made by Congress); Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,671-82 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that Congress did not create a policy when it directed
the agency to develop a standard that would ensure protection of worker health "'to the
extent feasible').
293. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1994)).
294. Clean Air Act, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955), (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7401 etseq. (1994)).
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participate in the process through which a legislative proposal is considered, then it must also be false that the rider process makes it uniquely
difficult for the public to hold legislators accountable for their decisions.
There is simply no difference between the ability to participate in the
process and the ability to discipline legislators based on the result of that
295
process.
These objections do not conclusively refute the rationales for questioning statutes such as section 318. However, they do suggest that the
judicial role in reviewing such statutes should be relatively narrow. Accordingly, the judicial role should focus on the characteristic that makes
section 318 so unusual: its format as an interpretation of pre-existing
statutory requirements. The quest for the trouble with Robertson thus
turns to two questions. First, is there a doctrine that can focus on this
particular characteristic of section 318? Second, would application of
any such doctrine respond to our intuitive suspicion of statutes such as
section 318?
C. Public Purposeand Equal Protection
Any constitutional fault with statutes such as section 318 need not rest
entirely on the empirical soundness of the participation and accountability concerns discussed above. Section 318's format is also troubling because it makes it difficult for the courts to review and evaluate any public
purpose the statute may be said to promote. Such a difficulty raises the
possibility of an equal protection violation.
In theory, at least, Congress legislates in order to achieve a purpose
that can be uncovered by a court when the judicial task requires discovery of such a purpose.' 96 The court can go about that discovery process
295. Of course, section 318 presents another accountability problem in that the voter
will still find the environmental statutes impacted by section 318, ostensibly unamended
and in full force throughout the country, in the statute books. However, the U.S. Code is
littered with statutes that qualify other statutes, even though the qualified statutes do not
reflect that fact, and even though the qualifying statutes may not appear in the same part
of the Code. For example, a number of statutes explicitly prohibit a particular government agency from making use of a particular exemption to the Administrative Procedure
Act's notice and comment provisions for informal rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
The generally-applicable exemption remains in place but is limited by the more specific
provision. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1262 (e)(1)(1994) (Health and Human Services Department procedure for declaring toys hazardous, prohibiting agency use of good cause exemption). Such a technical and subtle issue surely cannot give rise to a conclusion that
legislative accountability is sufficiently impaired so as to create a constitutional violation.
296. When the issue is simply the interpretation or application of a statute to a fact
pattern, discovery of an underlying purpose is not technically necessary. Other theories of
statutory interpretation, most notably the textualist approach often associated with Justice
Scalia, allow courts to answer interpretive questions without determining the statute's
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any number of ways: by reading the statute's own statement of legislative
purpose, examining indicators such as legislative history, or investigating
the underlying compromises between private parties that produced the
statute. Alternatively, a court can simply announce a legislative purpose
by hypothesizing one, a route often taken, for example, in modern equal
protection cases.29 In all of these cases, a purpose is identified, even if
the purpose is only, in a sense, constructive.
The deferential review implied by the Court's willingness to hypothesize a legislative purpose should not suggest that the purpose requirement is unimportant. Aside from the fact that the Court has continued
to insist on the purpose requirement despite such deference,9 the purpose requirement is necessary for the coherence of any judicial review of
legislative classifications. As Professor Tribe notes, the requirement of
rationality in a legislative classification
assumes that all legislation must have a legitimate public purpose or set of purposes based on some conception of the general good. Without such a requirement of legitimate public
purpose, it would seem useless to demand even the most perfect
congruence between means and ends, for each law would supply its own indisputable - and indeed tautological - fit: if the

means chosen burdens one group and benefits another, then the
means perfectly fits the end of burdening just those whom the
law disadvantages and benefiting just those whom it assists.

99

The assumption that legislation must have a public purpose in turn
purpose. See Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Justice Scalia,28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 396-97 (1995). Commentators have also critiqued the idea of searching for a coherent legislative purpose, on the theory that legislation is the product of bargaining between different interest groups, which produces not a
coherent statutory policy, but instead a cobbled-together compromise that may point in
conflicting policy directions. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court,
1983 Term, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984)
(setting forth this theory of legislation).
297. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1992) (speculating on possible
rationales for California's Proposition 13 property tax law).
298. See Sunstein, supra note 253, at 52 (noting the centrality of purpose requirement
despite deferential review of the purpose/means relationship).
299. TRIBE, supra note 229, § 16-2, at 1440 (footnote omitted). Essentially the same
point is made in what is generally considered to be one of the seminal analyses of the
Equal Protection Clause:
where are we to look for the test of similarity of situation which determines the
reasonableness of a classification? The inescapable answer is that we must look
beyond the classification to the purpose of the law. A reasonable classification is
one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
Tussman & tenBroeck, supra note 202, at 346.
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suggests that legislation cannot be thought of as a statement that preexisting statutory standards have been met. Instead, as Justice Powell
noted in Chadha, such a statement "appears clearly adjudicatory." 3 °° Intuitively, such a statement seems to lack the policy purpose necessary
under any equal protection doctrine that turns on the fit between a statute's classification and the reason underlying it.3°1
This analysis, if it holds up, thus suggests a surprising conclusion: that
section 318 should be vulnerable to an equal protection challenge on the
ground that it does not have any reasonably-discoverable legitimate purpose. This conclusion may be surprising because of the modern Supreme
Court's well known-and appropriate-aversion to second guessing legislative classification decisions, at least when they do not involve fundamental rights or suspect classes. However, the suggestion that section
318 runs afoul of equal protection does not require a revision of that
well-settled rule of deference because it does not call into question the
ability of Congress to make a classification of this sort (e.g., one that, as
here, classifies the Northwest forests differently from all other forests in
terms of the rules the government must follow in managing them). In
other words, using equal protection to strike down section 318 does not
require the Court to second-guess the substance of the legislature's classification decision. Instead, under this analysis the Court would examine
whether the manner in which Congress acted was one calculated to reflect any purpose at all. As argued above, Congress' decision in section
318 to act via a pronouncement that certain government conduct satisfied
a statutory requirement cannot be said to reflect any larger policy pur302
pose.
300. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 964 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).
301. See id. at 964-65 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("On its face, the
House's action [stating that several individuals did not satisfy the statutory criteria for suspension of their deportation] appears clearly adjudicatory. The House did not enact a
general rule; rather it made its own determination that six specific persons did not comply
with certain statutory criteria. It thus undertook the type of decision that traditionally has

been left to other branches."); see also DAVID R.

MIERS & ALAN C. PAGE, LEGISLATION

212 (1982) ("The enactment of legislation is... a purposeful activity, typically an aspect of
the wider implementation of government policy which is intended to have an impact in the
real world."); TRIBE, supra note 229, § 10-6, at 657 & n.8 (suggesting that a statute that
effectively applies law to individuals makes it more difficult to discern the legislature's
purpose in enacting the statute).
302. A caveat is in order at this point. It is possible that equal protection would not
apply to section 318 since the statute classifies forests, not persons (the beneficiaries of the
equal protection guarantee). But see supra note 232 (citing sources discussing the possibility of recognizing legal rights for inanimate objects). Nevertheless, it might be possible
to craft an equal protection argument on behalf of persons, such as users of the Northwest
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Thus, section 318 presents a situation unlike those presented in Fritz v.
Railroad Retirement Board where, at least according to Justice Brennan, the legislature mistakenly thought it was achieving a purpose that
the statute did not in fact promotej0 or in cases such as City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. ,35 where the Court has found statutes to
fail the rational basis test due to the illegitimacy of the government's motivation. 306 In those cases, the judicial criticism assumes the existence of a
legislative purpose, which is either not achieved by the statute (Justice
Brennan's view in Fritz) or is simply unacceptable (the Court's view in
cases such as City of Cleburne). Analogously, Professor Sunstein argues
that a fundamental value animating a variety of constitutional provisions
is that legislation should benefit the public, and not simply private interests.3°7 In the case of Professor Sunstein's private interest statute, just
like the statutes in Fritz and City of Cleburne, there is a discernible purpose to the statute; it just happens that the purpose-the legislature's desire simply and exclusively to confer a private benefit-is not legitimate.
By contrast to all of these situations, the problem with section 318 lies
with the structure of the statute, which is incompatible with the classic
conception of legislation in which the legislature perceives a particular
need and prescribes certain policies in order to satisfy the need. This
conception makes possible a judicial role in which courts scrutinize the
relationship between those ends and means, even if that scrutiny is extraordinarily deferential, as it is under modern equal protection's rational
basis standard.0 8 But such a relationship is impossible to discern in a
forests, whose interests in using those forests are treated differently than the interests of
users of other National forests due to section 318's exemption of the Northwest forests
from generally-applicable environmental laws. More broadly, however, the equal protection argument considered here applies to statutes that unquestionably classify persons and
thus are subject to the equal protection guarantee. For example, it could conceivably apply to the securities law amendment considered in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211
(1995), which imposed differing burdens on securities lawsuit defendants. See supra Part
III.B.1 (discussing Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in Plaut and the relationship between that opinion and this Article's singling out analysis).
303. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
304. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 193 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
305. 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (striking down application of a city zoning ordinance
used to require special use permit for the siting of a group home for mentally retarded
people).
306. See id. at 448-50; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (striking
down state constitutional amendment denying legal protection to gays and lesbians based
on their sexual orientation on the ground that the statute had no conceivable purpose except an illegitimate animus toward the burdened group).
307. See Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferencesand the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1689, 1731 (1984).
308. See generally TRIBE, supranote 229; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 202, at 346.
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statute such as section 318, at least if one accepts that a statutory interpretation analysis does not itself have a policy "purpose," and that the
performance of such an analysis is logically incompatible with the discovery or hypothesis of such a purpose.9
Boiled down, the theory is simply stated: if section 318 can be considered an act of statutory interpretation, no amount of judicial hypothesizing can logically yield the conclusion that it reflects a policy purpose.
But, this distillation elicits an immediate objection to the analysis,
namely, that a court could in fact discern a purpose behind section 318.
Indeed, common sense, confirmed by history, suggests that Congress' intent in enacting section 318 was to effect a temporary compromise solution to the conflict between conservation and economic values in the Pacific Northwest. Certainly this is a legitimate purpose, and a statute that
exempted the Northwest forests from all environmental laws and created
unique rules for their management would simply be required to pass
muster under standard equal protection ends-means review. But this
objection is not completely responsive to the "statutory purpose" hypothesis. The purpose requirement allows courts to review the rationality, and hence, the basic fairness, of the challenged action. A statute like
section 318 undermines the theoretical basis for this review. The statute
does not purport to classify persons or conduct, thereby allowing subsequent judicial review of the classification. Instead, it simply deems that
certain persons or conduct fit into pre-existing classifications. Thus, at
least as a formal matter, a statute like section 318 violates the assumption
of legislative purpose that, serves as the foundation for equal protection
review.
Ultimately, the suggested problem with section 318 is based on its format. Specifically, the theory is that section 318's format is logically inconsistent with equal protection analysis, because a purely interpretive
provision such as subsection (b)(6)(A) is inconsistent with any appropriate conception of legislative purpose. Thus, the fact that Congress could
have achieved what appeared to be the purpose underlying section 318
does not mean that section 318 is therefore constitutional. Of course, the
constitutional infirmity arises only if one puts significant weight on the
format by which Congress acted. So far, then, this analysis only makes
the most formalistic of cases for striking down section 318. This realization illuminates the real question about this analysis of section 318, the
309. See supra note 301 and accompanying text (noting the importance of a policy
purpose in legislation). But see Easterbrook, supra note 296, at 66-76 (criticizing attempts
to discern coherent purposes in statutes, given the ad hoc compromise nature of the legislative process).
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same question asked in a different doctrinal context by the Ninth Circuit
and the Supreme Court opinions in Robertson: is there any good reason
to take section 318's format so seriously? Should section 318 be struck
that Congress
down solely because of its format, when it is assumed
310
result?
substantive
same
exact
the
reached
could have
1. Does Format Matter?
The fact that Congress could have achieved the same substantive result
simply by amending the underlying laws is not necessarily a fatal objection. Commentators have either proposed or discerned in judicial opinions doctrines under which the Court would scrutinize the process or
format by which the legislature acted. For example, Professor Cass Sunstein reads the Court's gender discrimination cases as stressing the motivation underlying the legislature's enactment of a gender distinction.,
Similarly, Professors Farber and Frickey interpret Fullilove v.

Klutznick"' as reflecting a process-based concern whether Congress had
given sufficient thought to what the Court considered to be acceptable
reasons for a minority set-aside program."3 Since some gender and race
314
distinctions may be constitutional even without the nearly-impossible
satisfaction of the strict scrutiny test,3"5 inquiry into whether the legisla310. Compare Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir.
1990) (noting that Congress could possibly have written a constitutional statute achieving
the same result as did section 318, but concluding that this did not suffice to validate section 318 itself), with Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1992)
(concluding that section 318 was the functional equivalent of amendments to the underlying environmental statutes, and concluding that the format by which Congress acted was
constitutionally irrelevant).
311. See Sunstein, supra note 253, at 56-58 & n.122.
312. 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion) (upholding federal minority business setasides).
313. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 252, at 917 n.247 (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
456-467, 477-478, 490); see also Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi,
J., concurring in the result) (concurring in holding striking down New York's 168 year-old
assisted suicide law as violating the Equal Protection Clause but leaving open the possibility that the same statute repassed by modern New York legislature might be constitutional), rev'd, 521 U.S. 2293 (1997); ELY, supra note 289, at 169-70 (suggesting that modern repassage of a constitutionally-suspect statute originally enacted during a period when
the burdened group was denied effective representation may justify upholding of statute);
Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court: 1990 Term-Foreword:Antidiscriminationand ConstitutionalAccountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 77
(1991) (suggesting that the striking down of statutes is not the only option for judicial review of allegedly discriminatory laws and suggesting that, instead, courts may be justified
in remanding statute to legislatures for reconsideration and repassage that would then be
immune from judicial review).
314. See Gunther, supra note 205, at 8 (describing strict scrutiny as "fatal in fact").
315. But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (applying a test that may be
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ture had a benign motivation, or at least considered such a motivation,
may be appropriate.
Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Chadha'1 6 presents an example of the concern for format. In Chadha the Court held Congress to the
letter of the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment, despite the popularity of the legislative veto in restraining otherwise very broad grants of power to administrative agencies."' The majority's opinion reflected concern that these limits were the only way to
ensure some form of legislative deliberation."8 Indeed, it was the lack of
other controls on Congress, and the presence of other controls on administrative action, that explained for the Court why agency rulemaking
did not have to go through those same procedural steps.31 9 Nevertheless,
the Chadha Court refused to find constitutional fault with the particularity with which Congress wielded the legislative veto challenged in that
case, where Congress vetoed an INS decision suspending several named
individuals' deportations. Indeed, the majority opinion explicitly rejected Justice Powell's argument that the particular legislative veto at issue constituted adjudication and thus would be invalid even if enacted as
a formal statute.2
Therefore, in Chadha, the Court was concerned
enough to strike down a widely-used congressional tool on formalistic
grounds that reflected concerns about legislative deliberation, but nevertheless, implicitly sanctioned particularistic legislation that raised substantial concerns that the deliberative process would function poorly
against legislative oppression.3 2' The message from the Court was that
the best the Constitution could do in that situation was to ensure the potentiality of a proper legislative process byenforcing the explicit bicameralism and presentment requirements. So too here, the requirement
that a statute at least be formally characterizable as having a purpose
may be the only real limit imposed by the Equal Protection Clause's pur-

akin to strict scrutiny to a gender classification); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)
(suggesting that strict scrutiny is always appropriate for race classifications).
316. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (striking down legislative veto of agency action as violating bicameralism and presentment requirements for legislation).
317. See id. at 967-68 (White, J., dissenting) (noting the popularity of the legislative
veto for this reason).
318. See id. at 946-51.
319. See id. at 953-54 n.16 (noting the existence of judicial review of agency action and
the power of Congress to limit or revoke its previous grant of authority to the agency).
320. See id. at 957 n.22.
321. See id. at 956-59. Also, Justice Powell argued that the suspension of Mr. Chadha's
and five other individuals' deportation was too particularistic an action to trust to a majoritarian legislature. See id. at 960 (Powell, J. concurring).
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322

pose requirement
In both Fullilove and Chadha, the Court was less concerned with what
Congress did (creating set-asides or legislating particularistically), than
how it did it (by considering the inequality minorities suffered in obtaining contracting opportunities or by short-circuiting the bicameralism and
presentment requirements for legislation) 32 ' Likewise, there is a constitutional reason for the format restriction calling section 318 into question: if the Equal Protection Clause really does prohibit illegitimate legislative classifications, then, as Professor Tribe points out, 324 there must
be a justification, or purpose, against which a classification is challenged.
A statute that cannot be coherently read as containing such a purpose
fails this fundamental requirement.
Format restrictions may also affect the substance of the legislative
product. For example, commentators have suggested that the presence
or absence of a public-regarding purpose may matter to legislators who
are attentive to public opinion.12 According to this argument, judicial

322. Clearly, much more judicial scrutiny is possible at subsequent steps in the equal
protection analysis. For example, the Court has been moderately active in striking down
laws under the rational basis test on the grounds that the statute did not have a proper or
legitimate legislative purpose. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). However, this is a different
ground, arising at the next step in the analysis, from the one discussed here. In these
cases, the Court was able to determine or infer a statutory purpose and then conclude
whether it was legitimate. Cf. Russell W. Galloway, Jr. Basic Equal Protection Analysis,
29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121, 159-63 (1989) (discussing the rational basis test). For example, in Romer, the Court characterized the challenged state constitutional amendment
as having the purpose of an animus-driven desire to burden gays and lesbians. See Romer,
517 U.S. at 631-32. See also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. (identifying the purpose of
the challenged government action as the inappropriate fear of mentally retarded individuals). By contrast, section 318, as analyzed in this Article, suffers from an even more preliminary flaw-the lack of any purpose at all.
323. A small caveat to this statement is required by Justice Powell's concurrence in
Chadha. Under Justice Powell's analysis, Congress, in fact, might not have been able to
achieve the same result under the particular facts of that case (i.e., the exclusion of Mr.
Chadha and the other individuals named in the legislative veto) as this might have involved Congress either acting, unconstitutionally, as a court or enacting a bill of attainder.
See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 963-66 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). The majority rejected this analysis. See id. at 957 n.22. After Chadha, however, the Court, on Chadha's
authority, struck down legislative vetoes of agency actions even when Congress unquestionably could have achieved the same substantive result had it enacted a full-blown statute. See Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S.
1216 (1983), affg Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (striking down a legislative veto of a generallyapplicable agency regulation).
324. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
325. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation:An Interest-GroupModel, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 257 (1986).
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enforcement of a purpose requirement may lead to legislative deliberation and debate on the statute's probable efficacy in reaching any goals
asserted in the statute's text or legislative history. As Professor Tribe
states: "[b]y requiring the legislature to expose its purpose for observa326
tion the political processes are given a fuller opportunity to react to it.,
Commentators have suggested that such a political reaction may occur
even when courts hypothesize a public purpose. The theory is that that
courts' willingness to evaluate a statute based on whether it furthers such
a hypothesized purpose may convince interest groups to make the lack of
such a purpose explicit in the statute. In turn, an explicit denial of that
public purpose may raise the political cost of enactment and reduce the
likelihood of passage.327 If this analysis is correct, then the requirement
that a statute take a form consistent with the imputation of such a purpose, while seemingly formalistic, could in fact affect legislative substance.328
326. TRIBE, supra note 229, at 657 (discussing separation of powers); see also Macey,
supra note 325, at 240-41 (asserting that the purpose of the separation of powers principle
supports an activist approach empowering courts to act in the public interest); RoseAckerman, supra note 291, at 349-51 (discussing the public interest role in the legislative
process).
327. See generally Macey, supra note 325. Indeed, it is because he believes that legislation can legitimately be just a private interest compromise that Judge Easterbrook characterizes such private interest compromise-statutes as without a purpose, but nevertheless
argues in favor of judicial interpretation of such statutes so as simply to enforce the compromise. See Easterbrook, supra note 296, at 49-51 (arguing that private-interest statutes
should simply be read narrowly, to honor the bargain made in Congress between the competing interests, but that courts should not read into such bargain a public purpose that
does not exist).
328. Thus, even commentators who describe the legislative process as a pluralistic battle for private gain nevertheless advocate judicial review that seeks to maximize whatever
public-regarding nature can be found in the statute. For example, Professor Macey urges
use of a method of statutory interpretation that takes statutory invocations of a public
purpose at face value and makes those asserted purposes the touchstone for the interpretation of the statute, resulting with private rent-seeking deals that will be enforced only if
the private groups are willing to pay the price of foregoing the cover of such a publicregarding purpose. See Macey, supra note 325, at 250-56; see also Rose-Ackerman, supra
note 291, at 352-53. This is not a unanimous view, however. For example, Judge Easterbrook has also noted the existence of statutes that have no public purpose. For him, however, the existence of such private-regarding statutes, while no occasion for rejoicing, does
not justify the importation of a public purpose that never played a significant role in the
enactment decision. See Easterbrook, supra note 296, at 45-47. Since he believes that the
nature of the statute is akin to that of a contract (i.e., a bargained-for exchange), he sees
the role of the courts as the enforcers of that bargain; namely, the enforcement of the strict
terms of the statute, but nothing more, including no importation of a non-existent public
interest. See id. at 46. ("If legislation grows out of compromises among special interests.., a
court cannot add enforcement to get more of what Congress wanted. What Congress
wanted was the compromise, not the objectives of the contending interests. The statute
has no purpose.").
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The suggestion that courts should look for legislative purposes raises
the question of how careful that search should be. As indicated by cases
such as Fritz, this question is controversial.3 29 Nevertheless, the question
does not apply to our situation since, again, the absence of a legislative
purpose in section 318 is not a problem of stringency of review, but instead flows logically from the statute's very format. Thus, if there is to be
an equal protection requirement that legislation be logically susceptible
to a judicial discovery of a legislative purpose, then section 318 fails the
test under any level of scrutiny.
Thus, we have identified the problem with statutes such as section 318,
and have suggested a doctrinal justification for dealing with it. Can this
justification be applied coherently?
2. The "Statutory Purpose" Rule Applied
This analysis brings us back to United States v. Klein."° Specifically,
the proposed "statutory purpose" rule has distinct echoes of the interpretation of Klein requiring the legislature to act by changing the underlying
law, rather than by prescribing results under pre-existing law. This close
relationship should not be surprising. As suggested earlier, a statute
deeming pre-existing law to be satisfied is analogous to a judicial decision
reaching the same conclusion (i.e., they both constitute law interpretation). The fact that such a statute violates the Equal Protection Clause's
purpose requirement really means nothing more than that it is not truly
legislation. To the extent such a statute more closely resembles adjudication, the separation of powers, and specifically Klein, is implicated.33'
This analysis suggests that the equal protection requirement of a statutory purpose may accomplish the same purpose as Klein's supposed lawchanging/result-directing holding. This would be a welcome result, given
the difficulty courts and commentators have encountered in trying to
make sense of this part of Klein. Before embracing this solution to the
Klein problem, however, it is necessary to test out the "statutory purpose" rule, to determine whether in fact it does provide a satisfactory
means for resolving these sorts of issues. To the extent that this rule is
simply a restatement of the Klein test, it may well be susceptible to the

329. Compare United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 182 (Brennan,
J., dissenting), with id. at 176-77 n.10 (majority opinion) (criticizing Justice Brennan's

analysis).
330. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). See supra Part II (discussing Klein and courts' attempts to apply it).
331. See TRIBE, supra note 229, § 10-6, at 657-58 n.8 (linking the doctrine of separation

of powers and bill of attainder clauses in a similar way).
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same difficulty of application.
a. The Legislative InterpretationProblem
The "statutory purpose" rule requires simply that legislation be expressed in a format that can be characterized as having a purpose. This
generous test provides an enormous amount of leeway for Congress.
The sort of purpose that would satisfy this test ranges from the extremely
broad to the extremely narrow. An example of an extremely broad statute is one requiring users of toxic waste dumps to pay for their cleanup,
which might be characterized as motivated by a desire to impose such
costs on those who benefit from the polluting activities. An example of
an extremely narrow statute is one prescribing that a particular road be
built despite the existence of other laws that would otherwise prohibit its
construction, which might be characterized as motivated by a desire to
ensure construction of the road regardless of other generally-applicable
commitments that might stand in the way. These examples satisfy the
rule for the simple, if ultimately crucial, reason that they are logically
susceptible to a judicial discovery or hypothesis of an underlying purpose. Since the only criterion is this format consideration, questions
about the substantive rationality of a given classification would not enter
into this analysis, but would instead be treated by the subsequent equal
protection question of the statute's ends-means relationship.
Still, the second of these examples-a statute requiring construction of
a particular road despite contradictory laws-raises a serious question
about this analysis. In Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole,"' the Ninth Circuit rejected a Klein-based separation of powers challenge to just such a statute,
which ordered the Secretary of Transportation to approve a particular
highway project running through a park, notwithstanding any other provision of law."' The Ninth Circuit in Robertson distinguished Stop H-3,
by concluding that the statute in Stop H-3 did in fact change the law,
since that statute specifically stated that the statutory rule (construction
of the highway) would govern regardless of any other conflicting rule. In
general, this is the correct result: enunciation of such a rule should be
enough to justify upholding the statute, as it is just as susceptible to judicial imputation of a purpose as a broader rule of the type found in the
average statute, such as the hypothetical toxic waste cleanup statute
noted above.

332.

870 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).

333. Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783-349, § 114(a) (1986), reenacted in identicalform
as Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341-349, § 114(a) (1986).
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The more serious problem arises when statutes such as the one in Stop
H-3 appear to be motivated by a legislative belief that the statutory rule
represents a proper interpretation of pre-existing law. This seems to
have been the case with the statute challenged in Stop H-3.334 Even here,
our instinct should tell us that Congress should be able to speak to the
meaning of its prior work. The contrary conclusion seems illegitimate:
certainly, Congress should be able to ensure that its understanding of
pre-existing law controls, by enacting a subsequent statute enshrining explicitly that understanding.
But what does this conclusion do to our rule? For wouldn't the Stop
H-3 statute violate the "statutory purpose" rule if that rule necessarily
means that the legislature cannot apply particular facts to an underlying
legal rule? The Ninth Circuit's answer in Robertson (expressed not as an
answer to this Article's proposed "statutory purpose" rule but instead to
the closely-related Klein question) was that the Stop H-3 statute changed
the underlying law, through its "notwithstanding any other provision of
law" language. 335 This cannot be the total answer, though; otherwise, the
constitutional question turns on distinctions even more formalistic than
those underpinning the "statutory purpose" rule. If the "statutory purpose" rule is to be more than a formalistic check on the particular words
with which Congress legislates, there must be a more meaningful way to
deal with statutes, such as the one at issue in Stop H-3, where the enactment represents nothing less than statutory interpretation by the legislature.
Such a method may be found in the degree of plausibility of that interpretation; for example, the conclusion that Congress' interpretive act in
the Stop H-3 statute reflected a plausible reading of the pre-existing law,
while section 318's new requirements, by contrast, have very little to do
336
This rationale would
with fulfilling the affected pre-existing statutes.
334. See Stop H-3, 870 F.2d at 1438 (suggesting that members of Congress believed
that the road project at issue was consistent with the pre-existing environmental laws).
335. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
336. See id. at 1316.
The clear effect of subsection (b)(6)(A) is to direct that, if the government follows the plan incorporated in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5), then the government
will have done what is required under the environmental statutes involved in
these cases.
In this way Congress, through section 318, seeks to perform functions reserved to
the courts by Article III of the Constitution. For example, if the Secretary follows subsection (b)(3) and (b)(5), then the Secretary will be found to have used
the "principles of multiple use and sustained yield" and the "systematic interdis-
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also distinguish section 318 from other statutes that are understood to be
legislative responses to perceived judicial misinterpretations of previously-enacted statutes. Such legislative "corrections" occur relatively
frequently; for example, recent amendments to voting rights3 37 and employment non-discrimination 3 statutes seem to have been motivated at
least in part by an intention to overturn judicial interpretations of previous versions of those laws. 339 By contrast, it might be argued that section
318 represented an attempt by Congress to dictate an outcome without
either explicitly enunciating a new rule or plausibly interpreting preexisting law.
The importance of the plausibility of the congressional interpretation
lies in the fact that it reflects the congressional role in the iterated process of policy formulation that takes the form of legislative enactment, judicial interpretation, and legislative correction. To the extent that this
"legislative correction" really is a correction of a perceived judicial misinterpretation of the original statute, the correction can be viewed as part
of the law-making process, in effect, nothing more than increased statutory specification. So understood, such corrections, or even pre-emptive
"corrections" (pre-emptive because a court had not yet interpreted the
underlying original statute), relate back to the original statute, and thus
satisfy the "statutory purpose" requirement even if they appear to be
pure interpretive acts.
The test for when a statute should be considered interpretive need not
be stringent, in recognition of the respect that should be granted Congress' role in the interpretive dialogue. Thus, the Stop H-3 statute would
survive as a legitimate interpretation of the pre-existing environmental
statutes that otherwise might have been interpreted as barring construction of the road. By contrast, the sort of "non-interpretive interpretaciplinary approach" mandated by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1) and (2). In addition, the agency will be deemed to have
included detailed statements of adverse environmental effects and alternatives
required under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332. Also, there will have been no taking of
habitat as proscribed under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703.
Subsection (b)(6)(A) here at issue does not establish new law, but directs the
court to reach a specific result and make certain factual findings under existing
law in connection with two cases pending in federal court.
Id.
337. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the propensity of Congress
to overturn judicial interpretations of statues when Congress finds errors in the courts'
judgements).
338. See id.
339. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., OverridingSupreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 424-41 (1991) (listing statutes enacted in the past 30
years which have overturned Supreme Court decisions).
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tion" that would fail even this lenient test is exemplified by section 318
itself. As the Ninth Circuit demonstrated, section 318's new substantive
requirements were not plausible interpretations of the pre-existing law.340
Since it is not a plausible reading of the underlying environmental statof original enutes, section 318 cannot be considered part of theS string
341
actment-judicial interpretation-legislative correction.
Determining whether a statute such as section 318 represents a plausible reading of the statute it arguably interprets would seem to be a difficult, but by no means impossible, task. It is analogous to the task facing
the Court when it determines, for habeas corpus purposes, whether a
constitutional interpretation represents an extension of existing precedent or a newly-discovered rule,342 or when it determines, for Takings
Clause purposes, whether a regulatory statute represents a background
legal principle extant when the claimant purchased the property, or an
entirely new form of regulation.343 The inquiry is also analogous to a judicial determination whether a federal statute enacted pursuant to Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments 34 is an
appropriate enforcement measure or instead an illegitimate attempt to
interpret the Constitution. 34'
Of course, the interpretive task implied by this "plausible legislative interpretation" idea is not the exact same inquiry as those required by the
habeas corpus, takings and section 5 doctrines, since it requires comparisons not wholly between cases (the habeas doctrine) or between cases
and statutes (the takings and section 5 doctrines), but instead comparisons between statutes. In theory, at least, this inquiry may be more difficult, as it magnifies the always-present uncertainty about legislative intent by the need to consider the relationship between the handiwork of

340. See Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1316 (noting the requirements of the pre-existing environmental laws, and suggesting that section 318 did not plausibly interpret those requirements).
341. For a more general discussion of this issue, see William D. Araiza, Text, Purpose
and Facts: The Relationship Between CERCLA Sections 107 And 113, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 193 (1996). For a discussion of the specific issue of legislative history commenting
on judicial interpretation of an earlier version of a statute under consideration for
amendment, see generally Brudney, supra note 268.
342. See generally Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that the petitioner
could not benefit from a rule announced after his conviction became final).
343. See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
344. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2.
345. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 crossed the line from enforcement measure to
interpreting the Constitution).
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346

two different Congresses. In practice, though, this may not always be a
difficult inquiry. For example, as noted above,347 the Ninth Circuit demonstrated persuasively that section 318's requirements could not be
viewed as plausible interpretations of what the previously-enacted environmental statutes required. In such cases, it is relatively easy to conclude that the subsequent statute does not plausibly interpret the previously-enacted ones, and that therefore it cannot be expressed (like
section 318 was expressed) as a statement deeming those prior statutes to
be satisfied.
Finally, there may also be at least some political reality behind this
somewhat arcane distinction. If the failure to articulate a public purpose
may have some effect on a statute's chances for enactment, and thus
some political "bite," 348 then section 318's failure to articulate that it
works a change in pre-existing law, and is not merely an extension or an
interpretation of it, may have some, also. One commentator has suggested that legislative accountability is impaired whenever Congress purports to open government action to judicial scrutiny but then proceeds to
change the law during the pendency of the case.349 Surely such an afterthe-fact alteration of the law is even more accountability impairing if, as
with section 318, the format of the alteration is not as obvious.350 The
346. For an example of the difficulty inherent in this issue, see generally Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (reflecting different approaches among the justices
regarding the proper way to integrate a statute with amendments enacted by a subsequent
Congress), overruled on other grounds, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Of
course, this analysis assumes that it makes theoretical sense to view a later Congress' work
as an attempt to clarify the intent of the earlier Congress that enacted the original statute.
If one does not accept this assumption, then the analysis suggested in this Article simply
does not work, because the later statute could not be viewed as a clarification of the earlier Congress' intent, but instead as an independent enactment. In that case, a court would
have to integrate the later statute into the earlier statutory scheme, presumably based on
the textual provisions of both. See Araiza, supra note 341, at 219-21 (discussing Justice
Scalia's analysis of such an interpretive task in United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 139
(1988)). For our purposes, the important consequence of rejecting this assumption is that
the later enactment must satisfy or fail the "statutory purpose" requirement on its own,
without relating back to the original enacting statute. The correctness of this assumption,
or of the competing view, is beyond the scope of this Article.
347. See supra note 336 (quoting Robertson).
348. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 325 and accompanying text (noting that the existence
of a purpose may affect public opinion minded legislators).
349. See Young, supra note 69, at 1248-49.
350. See, e.g., Doidge, supra note 92, at 929 n.83 (suggesting an accountability rationale for distinguishing between section 318 and the statute challenged in Stop H-3, based on
the theory that the Stop H-3 statute's explicit exemption from the otherwise applicable
environmental laws was more open to public understanding, and thus public evaluation,
than section 318's more surreptitious "determines and directs" language). This Article's
argument does not depend on the strength of such a subtle and unproven empirical dis-
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impact of such accountability-impairing would be even greater if the altered laws are environmental laws, which have historically enjoyed broad
public support."'
b. LegislatingBy Definition

An important variant on the legislative interpretation problem arises
from legislatures' practice of explicitly defining key statutory terms.
Legislatures wield this authority nearly every time they enact a major
statutory program.32 In addition, a legislature will very often also define

terms used in particular statutory provisions.353 These practices, while
superficially violating the "statutory purpose" rule, in fact are not particularly troubling. They represent a necessary adjunct to the articulation of the substantive rule the legislature is enacting, ensuring that the
exact contours of that rule are understood by courts and private parties.
Thus, they represent not so much the interpretation of law as its articulation.
A legislature may also redefine a statutory term in response to a judicial ruling. An example of this sort of action is Congress' amendment of
the Taft-Hartley Act to exclude foremen from the definition of "employees," in response to a Supreme Court decision holding foremen to come
within the definition.354 Such redefinitions represent a more explicit type
of the legislative interpretation discussed in the previous subsection. As
tinction, given the "interpretive plausibility" theory sketched in the text above.
351. For example, broad public support convinced Republican leaders to back off election promises they had made during the 1994 congressional campaign to cut back on those
laws. See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, In a Reversal, GOP Courts the 'Greens,' N.Y. TIMES,
July 2, 1997, at Al (noting the political losses suffered by the Republican Party based on
its perceived anti-environmental stance); John H. Cushman, Jr., Environment Gets a Push
from Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1995, at All (noting the continued political popularity
of environmental protection despite an otherwise antigovernment political trend after the
1994 elections).
352. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) (defining terms used in the Administrative Procedure Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994) (defining terms used in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act); CAL. GOVERNMENT CODE § 11342
(West 1992) (defining terms used in California Administrative Procedure Act).
353. On July 31, 1999, a WESTLAW search of the United States Code database for
the words "term" and "means" within five words of each other yielded 4,445 hits. Many of
these may be statutory definition sections occurring at the start of a comprehensive statute. See supra note 352. However, a great many defined terms for purposes of a single
statutory provision or rule. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(1) (defining "agency" for purposes of § 552 differently than the general definition of that term in the Administrative
Procedure Act).
354. See Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, Title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 137, codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1994). This statute superseded the result in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB,
330 U.S. 485, 448 (1947), which held that foremen were "employees" for purposes of the
National Labor Relations Act.
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the legislature's answer to a court's interpretation of a statute, this practice can be justified as part of the dialogue between legislatures and
courts, at least as long as the redefinition is plausible.
Since, as noted above, such a "plausibility" test can accommodate significant deference to the legislature,355 redefinitions could satisfy this test
even without an intervening judicial interpretation, as long as the redefining could be explained as something other than a desired change in the
substance of the law. As an example of such a redefinition, consider the
Coast Guard inspection statute at issue in Ace Waterways, Inc. v. Fleming.31 6 The statute, enacted in the nineteenth century, required inspection
of "steam vessels," which it originally defined as "[e]very vessel pro' A 1933 amendment
pelled in whole or in part by steam."357
to the law,
however, redefined "steam vessels" to include "[e]very vessel . . . propelled in whole or in part by steam or by any otherform of mechanical or
electricalpower., 358 The court applied the changed definition, using language acknowledging apparently limitless congressional power to legislate by redefining previously-enacted statutory terms.35 9 Even more than
section 318, statutes such as the one in Ace Waterways appear at first
glance to conflict with the statutory purpose rule.
But, even the statute in Ace Waterways can be harmonized with the
"statutory purpose" rule. According to the court, the redefining statute
was intended to modernize a law that had been drafted before the development of internal combustion engines.3' 6 Thus, even this statute, as contradictory to the original term as it seems, appears nevertheless to have
been enacted as an updating of the original Congress' intent. If the
original intent was that any non-sail-powered vessel was to be subject to
the inspection requirement, then the development of new non-sail means
of power required new statutory language to ensure that the statute retained its original effect. Thus, the 1933 amendment seems to have been
a part of the original legislative string, simply updating the statute to take
account of technological change that required statutory change if the
original purpose of the statute was to be vindicated.
Thus, legislative interpretation, whether accomplished by definition or
redefinition of statutory terms or by less explicit interpretive acts (such

355. See supra text accompanying notes 340-341.
356. 98 F. Supp. 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
357. Id. at 667 (quoting the original statute).
358. Act of June 13, 1933, ch. 61, § 4399, 48 Stat. 125 (emphasis added).
359. See Ace Waterways, 98 F. Supp. at 667 ("Congress has a right to legislate by definition if it chooses.").
360. See id.
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as the statute in Stop H-3), is consistent with the "statutory purpose"
rule.16' But has this distinguishing job been too successful?
3. Reconsideringthe Rule
Despite the justifications offered, the "no statutory purpose" rule still
emerges from the preceding discussion seriously bruised. Unless we are
to place greater weight on the deliberation and accountability concerns
that this Article suggested but then minimized, the only substantial support for the rule comes from its importance to the formal structure of
equal protection analysis. As suggested above, this rule puts into place a
baseline against which to judge the appropriateness of the legislature's
classifications. This role is crucial to equal protection theory. Paradoxically, though, the rule appears to be somewhat empty, given the easy
ways (for example, rewording of the provision as a substantive rule featuring a "notwithstanding any other provision of law" clause) that a legislature could be said to have drafted a statute with a purpose. The
problem is compounded by the further limitation this Article has concluded is necessary to the rule: namely, that there may be situations
where it is constitutionally appropriate for a legislature to legislate by
definition, the ultimate interpretive act. The rule that emerges, then, is
one that is not only easily evaded, but that also has only a narrow range
of applicability to begin with. One way to think about this rule, then, is
as a doctrinal Maginot Line, holding fast against direct assaults but utterly useless against simple flanking movements.
What this paradox suggests is that the purpose requirement, as currently applied in equal protection law, may not mean very much. If a
violation of that requirement (for example, the deeming of statutory requirements to be satisfied, as in section 318) is functionally indistinguishable from other actions that must be viewed as satisfying the requirement
(such as redefining the key statutory terms or rewording the statute as a
non-interpretive statement) then the purpose requirement itself seems to
present no real barrier to legislative action. 62 Of course, it may be that

361. As noted above, this analysis assumes the validity of a legislative intent-based
theory of statutory interpretation. See supra note 346.
362. Professor Sunstein argues that the purpose requirement should function to invalidate what he calls "naked preferences," that is, legislative action that has no publicregarding goal in mind but merely represents an aggregation of private preferences with
sufficient political power to enact the preference as legislation. See Sunstein, supra note
307, at 1731-32. This conception has been forcefully attacked on the ground that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a court to determine objectively when a statute should be so
characterized. See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L. J.
1685, 1694-1700 (1988) (arguing that competing interpretations of statutes can almost al-
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political realities do in fact limit the ability of Congress to redraft otherwise problematic legislation as direct policy commands satisfying the
"statutory purpose" rule. Ultimately, the value of a format restriction of
the sort suggested by the "statutory purpose" rule may turn on one's estimate of those political realities. As noted in the discussions of the anticommandeering and non-delegation doctrines363 and in the proposals for
requiring more evidence of legislative deliberation,36 commentators disagree on that empirical issue. Compared to the anti-commandeering and
non-delegation doctrines, however, the "statutory purpose" rule is an arguably weaker doctrine, since it is purely format-based,
and does not dis3 65
able Congress from achieving any particular result.
Thus, once again, the relationship of this Article's equal protection
analysis arrives at a similar point as the separation of powers analysis in
Klein and Robertson. Just as the purported Klein distinction between
law changing and result directing appears to collapse, as suggested by the
366
cases that have tried to apply that distinction, so too this Article suggests that, at base, the statutory purpose requirement may be problematic at its core: easily evadable by expedients of unquestioned constitutionality, and quite possibly responsive to no serious political process
flaw beyond those endemic to a legislative process that, by its very comways be reasonably viewed as serving some conception of the public interest).
363. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 279-288.
365. Of course, the anti-commandeering and non-delegation doctrines can also be described as purely format based, to the extent they merely disable Congress from achieving
a particular result by, respectively, commandeering state government institutions or legislating without reaching a policy choice. See generally Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette Tips:
Some Implications of "Process Federalism", 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175 (1994) (describing anti-commandeering jurisprudence as imposing only procedural limits on Congress' power over state governments). Yet limits on the decision to use state governments
as instruments of federal policy, or to legislate so broadly as to violate whatever remains of
the non-delegation doctrine, appear to be more substantive than the limits imposed by the
"statutory purpose" rule, in that the constitutional infirmity is not cured by the same sorts
of easy expedients that seem to satisfy the "statutory purpose" rule. At base, the distinction reflected by the statement in the text reflects the view that decisions to commandeer
state governments or to legislate broadly are integral parts of the legislative policy, and
not mere matters of the style through which that policy is expressed. By contrast, the
"statutory purpose" rule as developed in this Article, by exempting from its coverage
statutory formats that yield the exact same substantive result, appears to be much more a
matter of style, and thus qualitatively different from the anti-commandeering and nondelegation doctrines. This difference remains even if one believes that there are political
accountability concerns that lead the legislature to prefer a statutory style like section
318's to one that explicitly amends the pre-existing law. The key point is not whether
there are real reasons for Congress to prefer one style over another, but rather, whether
the difference can be viewed reasonably as influencing the statute's real effect.
366. See supra Part II (discussing courts' attempts to apply Klein).
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plexity, manages to hide its details from the electorate."'
V. CONSEQUENCES

This Article's analysis has led to a discouraging result. Statutes like
section 318 raise fundamental issues regarding the appropriate line between legislative and judicial power. As this Article has explained, that
line does not simply help define the constitutional structure of the federal government, but also plays a direct role in guarding individual rights.
Given the important role that line plays, the inability to delineate it by
means of a satisfactory, judicially-enforceable test is troubling.
Of course, the lack of a judicially enforceable test does not mean that
the line does not exist. Instead, it may simply mean that the line reflects
what Professor Sager calls an "underenforced constitutional norm,"
which he defines as a constitutional principle that courts are institutionally unable to enforce but that nevertheless exists and binds other governmental decision makers.36 Indeed, Professor Sager identifies the
equal protection principle of treating likes alike as such a norm, at least
in that principle's application to social and economic legislation that burdens neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right.369
This Article does not consider in detail whether Professor Sager's thesis extends appropriately to the hybrid separation of powers/equal protection issues raised by section 318. It should be at least noted, though,
that arguments can be made on both sides. For example, this Article has
suggested that judicial review of the legislative process (e.g., judicial review of the deliberation Congress gave to an ultra-specific substantive
appropriations rider) would entangle courts in a judicially unmanageable
task. On the other hand, statutes such as section 318 present nothing less
than a challenge to the independence of the federal courts as a separate,
co-equal branch of the national government. Given the importance of
the principle at stake, judicial under-enforcement of this norm may be
inappropriate.
367. Cf., e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(suggesting that legislation impeding political expression and free speech should be subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny, since barriers to such activities make it more difficult to
use the legislative process to repeal such laws).
368. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of UnderenforcedConstitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212,1213-14 (1978).
369. See id. at 1215-18.
370. Indeed, Professor Sager's two primary examples of roles for other governmental
entities in articulating underenforced constitutional norms-Congress' section 5 power to
"enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment, and state courts' power to protect federal constitutional rights more generously than federal courts-both involve situations where there is
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Rather than concern itself with that debate, this Article has examined
a preliminary question: whether some doctrinal approach provides a judicially-manageable mechanism for checking this clear, if distant, threat
to the autonomy of the federal courts. The benefit of such a mechanism
should be clear. First, statutes such as section 318 threaten the fundamental constitutional balance and, ultimately, the individual rights that
that balance seeks to protect.371 Second, other governmental actors are
not likely to contest this sort of legislative action.3 72 The importance of
such a mechanism makes its absence, or at least the absence of a completely satisfactory version, all the more troubling.
But the absence of a perfect judicial response to this problem does not
excuse the Supreme Court's failure even to begin the search. Sooner or
later, litigants will press such claims in contexts more compelling than
section 318-a "jobs versus environment" compromise that does not
classify individuals and thus does not directly implicate the individual
rights protections that derive from the separation of powers.373 Indeed, in
no challenge to the fundamental status of the federal courts in the constitutional system.
See generally Sager, supra note 368 at 1228-63 (discussing these two examples). Congress'
section 5 power is, of course, textually granted, and even though it is limited to "enforcement" and not "interpretation" of the Fourteenth Amendment, that power, at least arguably, represents an explicit sharing of interpretive power, perhaps when, for example, Congress is uniquely able to perceive facts that require a specific response in order to
guarantee the Amendment's protections. Sager's discussion of state court interpretations
of federal constitutional provisions considers only the question whether the United States
Supreme Court should correct such "overly generous" interpretations through the latter's
certiorari power. This is merely an argument about how the Court should use its discretion over its docket. Neither of these two examples implicates the federal judiciary's
status as a co-equal branch of the federal government. By contrast, a statute such as section 318, which at least raises a substantial question whether Congress is dictating how the
judiciary should adjudicate certain cases, presents a much clearer threat to the judiciary's
core status.
371. See text accompanying supra notes 176-177.
372. Cf. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)
(noting "[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed
the outer limits of its power"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,129 (1976) ("[T]he debates of
the Constitutional Convention, and the Federalist Papers, are replete with expressions of
fear that the Legislative Branch of the National Government will aggrandize itself at the
expense of the other two branches."). There is no reason to believe that the Executive
branch, or the states, would be motivated to resist legislative attempts to interfere with the
judicial function. If such attempts reflect a singling out of unpopular groups, it is generally
assumed that the courts are the most appropriate institution to enforce the Constitution's
requirements. On the other hand, if such attempts merely reflects a desire to micromanage a policy issue by interfering with the courts' ability to interpret generallyapplicable laws, the executive will presumably go along with the effort as long as he agrees
with the underlying policy.
373. See supra note 302 (noting legal rights are not likely recognized for inanimate
objects).
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Robertson itself an amicus argued that section 318 violated the separation of powers doctrine due to its extreme specificity.374 The Court declined to consider the argument, as it had not been raised below or by a
party to the litigation. 3 ' But, such a challenge becomes more and more
likely, given Congress' continued use of particularistic directives that do
not explicitly purport to amend existing law, the increased academic interest in methods of scrutinizing statutes for flaws in the enactment process, 376 and the slow accretion of precedent, such as the concurring opinions in Chadha and Plaut, suggesting judicial recognition of limits on
legislatures' power to enact precisely-targeted statutes.
If this Article has demonstrated anything, it is the fundamental structural and individual rights implications of such a challenge, and the
enormous difficulty in developing a satisfactory response. But the problems posed by such a challenge will not go away by denying their existence. Indeed, by engaging in such denial, the Supreme Court actually
does more damage than if it were to acknowledge them but admit that it
was institutionally incapable of devising a solution.377 By concluding that
section 318 was an unexceptional exercise of the legislative power, the
Robertson Court seems to have engaged in exactly this denial. Breezily
concluding that section 318 created "no occasion to address any broad
question of Article III jurisprudence, 3 71 the Court may have created a
troublesome precedent in its consideration of future cases. In the end,
the Court's refusal to face such broad and difficult questions may be the
real trouble with Robertson.

374. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Public Citizen at 12-13, Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1990) (No. 90-1596).
375. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1990).
376. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 325, at 261-62 (suggesting increased judicial scrutiny
of actual stated legislative purposes in order to create a legislative dynamic in which there
is more legislative debate on such purposes); Sunstein, supra note 243, at 1582 (arguing
that courts in a republican polity should use statutory interpretation to guard against or
limit "possible malfunctions in the legislative process"); Zellmer, supra note 267, at 458
(searching for method to allow heightened judicial scrutiny of appropriations riders).
377. Such a course would, of course, amount to an explicit embrace of Professor
Sager's concept of underenforced constitutional norms. See supra notes 368-370 and accompanying text.
378. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441.
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